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Abstract
Workers'
compensation insurance companies have been at the vanguard of
workplace safety initiatives maintaining laboratories, training facilities, intern programs,
and hierarchical structures. Up until the late 1980's, risk control services were provided
to clients as a customer service, with the costs hidden in the premiums. Many companies
estimated 4-5 percent of the premium amount was devoted to risk control departments.
The late 1980s brought about a change that some attribute to amisapplication of
Deming's Total QualityManagement (TQM) philosophy. Insurance companies tried to
make the move to accountability, thinking that it would drive customer service to a
"Deming" level and would create even higher profits. To accomplish this, companies
made every department, including customer service functions such as risk control, profit
centers. Risk control services that were previously funded through hidden costs were
now sold at a rate of$130 - $200 per hour. Within companies, departments that
traditionally had worked together began to avoid each other because of internal cost
factors. Taken to the extreme, the result was that companies began "to feed on
themselves." Moral decisions were replaced by a cost benefit analysis: profit became the
primary focus.
Large deductible policies produced the secondmajor change that impacted the
role ofrisk control. Finding persons willing to go "on the
record"
regarding the impact is
difficult, but the results are easily deduced. When there is a large deductible, the
insurance company's assets are not in danger until losses approach the deductible amount.
Large deductibles mitigate the insurance companies losses, but the health and safety of
client employees are often minimized and even ignored. Because so little iswritten on
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this subject, primary research consisting of interviews was conducted and opinions were
compiled. Most respondents concurred that the profit center fixation had adverse impacts
on employee health and safety.
KeyWords: Bundled, unbundled, 'free labor', strict liability, employer's liability,
negligence, tort,
workers'
compensation, downsizing, fiduciary, outsource, vendor,
billable hours, profit center, underwriting, deductible(s), profits, third-party
administration.
1.0 Introduction
During the Industrial Age, workplace injuries within the United States were seen
primarily as an interruption to production;
employers'
primary concern was finding a
replacement employee as rapidly as possible. For this reason, reliable data regarding
workplace injuries was scarce. It was not until 1869, whenMassachusetts established the
first state Bureau ofLabor Statistics, that state agencies began collecting data and
conducting inspections ofworkplaces to document both health and safety hazards as well
as safe work practices. A decade later, states began to pass "FactoryActs" estabhshing
regulations and inspections to ensure that workplaces had adequate ventilation,
emergency exits, and procedures for safe machinery repair. In 191 1, Wisconsin's
adoption of
workers'
compensation legislation fueled the spread of similar legislation
throughout the United States: 43 states had passedworkers'compensation laws by 1921.
Even so, reliable data on injuries and illnesses remained scarce making it difficult to track
the state ofthe nation's safety record. The passage of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA) in 1971 mandated tracking of
workers'illnesses and injuries on a national
scale. In 1973, the first year forwhich reliable data are available, 1 1 out ofevery 100
workers suffered injuries on the job (Conaway).
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This thesis was startedwith the objective of tracing the impact of
workers'
compensation on workplace safety. In researching the subject, I found the political
complexity of the origin of
workers'
compensation striking. The arguments of 1880 and
the early twentieth Century regarding workers' compensation appear to be identical to the
political arguments used today in relation to social security and other social programs.
The same pejoratives that are commonly used today such as "Welfare
State,"
"Socialism,"
or
"Conservatism"
were a normal part of the language regarding the
establishment of
workers'
compensation and continued to be used today in similar attacks
on other social programs.
Moving from the 18th century into the 19th and twentieth century, the United
States has had to undergo changes from rugged individualism ofManifest Destiny to the
"survival of the fittest"mentality that governed the earliest days of the Industrial
Revolution, to the beginnings ofworkers' compensation governed bywhatmany saw as
socialistic fluffphilosophy predicated on such vague phrases as "the common
good." In
the end, the fight for
workers'
compensation in 1880 appears to be the same fight as in
2005 between persons with a progressive interpretation of life versus the conservative
interpretation.
As the country progressed toward providing aworkingmodel of
workers'
compensation, it had to recognize the need to detennine whether aworkplace injurywas
the fault of the employee or the employer. Dominant thinking in the
19th
century was that
an employee knew the hazards of the workplace; therefore itwas his fault ifhe were
injured regardless ofanymechanical hazards present in the workplace. Suing an
employer was unheard ofasmost employees were too impoverished to seek legal aid.
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Furthermore, the possibility of losing their job through an attempted legal action was very
real (Witt).
Because the primary focus ofworkers' compensation insurance is reduction or
elimination ofworkplace injuries, the workers' compensation insurance industry has been
a major driver in the fields ofoccupational safety and health. Within the insurance
industry, safety disciplines have been enshrouded within the insurance jargon ofworkers'
compensation, general liability, environmental liability, products liability, property and
casualty and business interruption. The battle in 1880 was whether workers
compensation would be private insurance or state insurance. (Witt)
Formany years, insurance companies costs were largely impacted by the ability of
their safety arm - risk control departments - to identify and correct physical conditions
that presented unacceptable loss potential. At times, the risk control department played a
major role in the underwriter's decision to write or cancel an insurance policy based on
the risk evaluations.
The unstated objectives ofrisk control tell amore detailed and complex story.
Risk control objectives were not necessarily aimed at either addressing the operating or
management systems of the client or the root causes of the client's health and safety
issues. Because the common policy was written on a short-term basis, typically one year,
the goal was to get a client through the policy year without loss, thereby protecting the
revenue of the underwriter (Montagna). Fortunately, the relationship between the client
and underwriter, in relation to loss reduction, is symbiotic. In this phase, the cost of risk
control to the clientwas hidden and the "insurance
inspector"
was the "eyes and ears" for
underwriting. (Farren)
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Starting in the mid-1980's and progressing through themisapplied approach to
Deming's TQM and Continuous ImprovementModel and then to the existing results-
oriented approach of the 21st century, the role ofRisk Control in the insurance industry
has changed substantially (Negro). The title "Inspector" has often had a negative
connotation, implying a person that is shortsighted,myopic and driven by physical
hazards or conditions. While it was commonly accepted thatmost accidents were due to
the human element rather than physical conditions, risk control was perceived as being
driven by physical conditions (Farren). With the advent ofTQM, "inspector's" became
"Consultants,"
reflecting the change in risk control philosophy and TQM's emphasis on
"partnering with customers." Also at this time, costs for risk control were often
"unbundled"
meaning the client paid separately for risk control services; this was a major
motivation for risk control experts and companies to seek partnering opportunities with
commercial clients (Faga).
The unbundling or charging clients for risk control services brought about
negative and positive changes.
Negative changes:
? Clientswith poor records and underfunded clients did not receive help since
they could not afford to pay for risk control services.
? Clients that had limited budgets for consulting "got as much safety as they
could afford, but not necessarily as much as was
needed."
? The quality of risk control work became dependent upon what the client could
afford.
Positive changes:
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? Risk control was driven by client request rather than underwriting allowing for
greater customization of services and accountability for service providers.
? Risk control met client needs as the clients perceived them rather than
underwriters determining needs.
? Risk control operated only for the client thereby eliminating split loyalties
between the client and underwriters.
? Risk control is, at times, restricted from communicating negative factors to
underwriting.
This work will document the origins ofworkers'compensation, then compare
changes in insurance risk control or safety services, also known as EHS, to internal and
external clients that have occurred in the insurance industry since risk control
departments were changed to profit centers and services unbundled from policies. Itwill
use interviews to examine several approaches to risk control from the pre-1985 version of
"underwriting or single-policyyear,"bundled approaches in which risk control was a
hidden part of the premium, and
"inspectors"
were known as the "eyes" of the
underwriter, to current
"unbundled"
service contracts inwhich the client will pays a la
carte for services provided by the
"consultant." It will also examine the "billable hours"
concept and the change to revenue based performance standards for EHS. Further, itwill
investigate the current practices ofconsultants who are often oriented to management
systems type evaluations and not to the "account
management"
method which in which
outsourced vendors and brokers within downsized Risk Control Departments are
employed.
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Recorded interviews were conducted with five experienced risk control
consultants to document the status of risk control departments in recent years. One other
brief and unrecorded interviewwas conducted with the National Sales Manager ofa
company for its risk control department. The interviews garnered the opinions of these
consultants regarding the impact of large deductibles on risk control. Such deductibles
often have the effect ofeliminating the need for risk control. Further, under such policies
the practical meaning of the word
"safety" becomes confused with concepts of risk
transfer. Now an account is unsafe only after a loss has consumed enough of the
deductible to bring the policy into play. The severity or frequencywith which employees
are injured is not important, unless associated costs surpass the deductible. Money
becomes the bottom line, not safety.
1.1 Significance of the Topic and Significant Questions
The economic impact of the decisions that businesses make regarding EHS is
undeniable. Unfortunately, companies do not always do the right thing. They sometimes
do the affordable thing, which often means doing nothing for a specific budget cycle. The
economic impact ofworkers'compensation on a business' bottom line is undeniable: less
is more as far as a business is concerned, despite the impact on health and safety issues.
From the "bundled"workers'compensation insurance packages that included
claims and risk control services through the late 1980's whenworkers' compensation
premiums were unbundled from claims services and risk control, the impact of risk
control on workplace safety has changed dramatically (Farren). Risk control services
often parallel the budgetary decisionsmade by financially stressed companies.
Some critical questions this thesis will attempt to explore are as follows:
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? What are the ethics of "as much safety as can be afforded"?
? What is the role of the EHS professional when hazards are noted, but the
client cannot afford to have the EHS consultant address them? Does this
present an ethical challenge to the safety professional?
? In an "unbundled" environment, quality is defined by howmuch quality the
client can afford. Does as much safety as can be afforded equal 100 percent
compliance and for situations involving life and safety issues is anything less
than 100 percent compliance adequate?
? What are the positive and negative impacts ofdownsizing? Downsizing
impacted EHS Departments as well as other industries. EHS staffs are now all
seasoned, credentialed, 20-year employees (Montagna). This is not
necessarily a positive because a staffneeds to be balanced in terms ofage,
experience, and pay scale to manage and service clients profitably.
? Where will the next generation of insurance EHS consultants come from? Is
insurance EHS a secure field at this time? Persons that understand EHS and
all of the associated insurance implications usuallymust be developed from
within the industry and less talent is being developed now.
? When the risk is transferred through concentration on deductibles or cost
methodologies and the calculation becomes "howmuch safety can we
afford,"
does the goal ofzero defects become antithetical to "safety"?
? Has improvement become the actual goal rather than zero defects? Is
improvement inordinately rewarded over zero defects?
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? What is the impact of revenue-based performance goals (billable hours) on
risk control decisions?
? What has been the impact ofdownsizing on the upstream ofEHS expertise
and jobs within the insurance industry?
? What has been the impact to workers' compensation and risk control as a
result ofdeductible policies and unbundled services?
Sometimes, the origins ofwhere we beganmay say something important about
where we are. In researching for this thesis, it appears that little has changed over the
years.
1.2 Reason for Interest in this Topic
I have been employed in the field ofrisk control for companies related to the
insurance industry since 1977. During this time, the role of the risk control consultant
has changed significantly. The role has progressed from the inspectorwho was the "eyes
and ears of
underwriting"
and paid for by underwriting, to consultants that are part ofa
third- party administration platform in which the client pays for all claims management
and risk control services, sometimes without any policy. During this time, workers'
compensation policies started to be writtenwith deductibles. Deductibles transferred the
risk and complicated the role of the risk control consultant. For example, I was assigned
a large aluminum foil producing company, which is now defunct; the company's workers'
compensation policy had a $1,000,000 deductibleper occurrence. The insurance
companywas in no jeopardy ofpaying money on any loss until the loss claim exceeded
the $1,000,000 deductible. Such a high deductible is actually away ofbeing self-insured
and using the insurance company to do so. However, once the deductible policywas
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written, no work was conducted with the account because underwriting had no impetus to
pay for safety services. Specific claims that exceeded the $1,000,000 deductible were
rare and when they did occur, the insurance company paid only the amount that exceeded
$1,000,000 deductible. There was no longer anymotivation for the insurance company to
get involved. Mymotivation also ended and the pressure on the client was eliminated as
well. Safety became associated with the cost ofthe deductible.
To many, the EHS field contains a largelymoral element. Historically, the goal
was to save life and limb, regardless of the financial or legal arrangements. Ofcourse,
the symbiotic relationship between EHS and profitability has been a driver for the
insurance industry, so much so, that it was given great credit for safety progress.
13 Definitions
Billable hours - Refers to hours expended by risk control consultants to provide services;
the hours are then billed to a client at a specified rate per hour.
Bundled - Refers to insurance services such as claims handling and risk control that are
hidden in the insurance premium without obvious cost to the insured.
Unbundled - Refers to insurance services that are detached from the cost of the premium
and forwhich insureds will pay a separate fee.
Deductible(s) - Amethod of transferring risk from the insurance company back to the
insured for a predetermined amount. The insurance company will have no financial
exposure below the limits of the deductible.
Downsizing - Refers to the systematic and planned reduction in the employee size ofa
department.
Employer's liability - The responsibility of the employer to exercise due care and
precautions. Employer's liabilitymay be enforced by lawsuit from the employee.
Fiduciary - A special relationship ofobligated trust for the insurer and/or the insured.
Free labor - Refers to work or employment that is voluntary and forwhich the employee
is paid. The term free labor is used in contrast to slave labor.
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Negligence - The omission or neglect of any reasonable precaution, care, or action.
Outsource - A vendor or contractor, hired for EHS services.
Profit center - A department held accountable for profitable revenue production.
Risk transfer - A method of transferring risk and exposure, typically by purchasing
insurance or establishing deductibles.
Strict liability - Describes responsibility or liability that is absolute, regardless of fault.
Tort - Anywrongful act, damage or injury, done willfully or negligently or involving
strict liability forwhich a civil suitmay be brought. It is a central provision ofcommon
law.
Third-party administrator - An entity that will manage and deliver services that are
unbundled from insurance policies.
Underwriting The arm ofan insurance company that is responsible for evaluating the
businesses for the purpose of insurability and setting an appropriate price for risk
exposure.
Vendor - A contractor that is hired for risk control services.
Workers'
compensation - a no-fault plan to provide medical and wage benefits to
employees injured on the job.
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2.0 Background
2.1 Historical Perspective
Most surprising was the historical perspective of
workers'
compensation. The
battle regarding
workers'
compensation began shortly after the Civil War when factories
designed for producing war equipment and armaments were changed to textile factories,
commonly known as "sweat
shops" (Witt). By 1 880, more people were dying each year
from industrial accidents than in the Civil War. Even the President, Theodore Roosevelt,
chose to address industrial accidents as a priority (Witt).
The political battle that raged then is the same that exists today between
conservatives who believed in "rugged individualism" and "survival of the fittest" and the
progressives who believed in the government doing some things for the "group
good."
The progressives won the battle, partially because the presumption was that the
workers'
compensation system would be an incentive to protect workers from safety exposures.
The impact of the progressives winning the debate carried over into all portions of
American society including group programs such as unemployment insurance and social
security. The battle rages on, evidenced by the fact that the United States is the only
western countrywithout national health care (Witt).
Notmuch has beenwritten regarding the insurance risk control position,
particularly regarding its differences with traditional EHS. In addition, risk control
departments have been downsized significantly over the last 10 years as is reflected in the
interviews (Faga, Montanga); in the case ofmy own company, field staffhas been cut
from approximately 450 to 50. Ultimately, this paper will reflect on an industry that is
critical to insurance company profitability, but has largely been ignored. The transition of
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risk control departments to profit centers has impacted staffing. Specifically, the
transition has reduced expertise and training budgets, depleted upstream staff, and most
importantly, obscured the objective to address safety and environmental concerns in order
to save lives. Now, a successful risk control specialist strives to keep losses within the
deductibles. This is actually another method of risk transfer, rather than away of
promoting safety.
The integration ofEHS with business is the right thing to do, but at times this may
negatively impact the simple purity of safety for the sake ofprotecting human lives and
property. As a general principle, we can seek profitability to a degree ofdiminishing
returns. Hopefully, the push for EHS sustainability, will bring us back to our collective
senses.
2.2 Origins
On June 10, 1907, Georgia Day and President Theodore Roosevelt were visiting
Norfolk, Virginia to speak at the Jamestown Exposition at the World's Fair. The theme
of the convention that yearwas reconciliation as the Civil War was still a vivid memory
in the nation's conscience. General Stephen Lee was there, having been elected a state
senator inMississippi in 1 878 and being a delegate to theMississippi Constitutional
Convention of 1890 (Witt). Roosevelt himselfwas half-son of the south through his
mother, a native ofGeorgia, and great grandfather, Governor ofGeorgia. (Washington
Post 1907).
The gravity of reconciliation was the suspected theme ofhis speech; however,
President Roosevelt chose to address a different theme and a problem that neither the
founders of theWorld's Fair nor participants in the Civil War had the vision to see or
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address (Witt). His chief subject was the problem of industrial accidents in the new age
of industrialization. This dilemma was magnified by hordes ofdesperately poor new
immigrants, inequalities between rich and poor, child labor abuses, and disconnect
between the American ideal of"rugged individualism" and the realization that there were
some issues that would require "mutual interdependence" (Witt).
In his speech, Roosevelt speech said, "the great increase inmechanical and
manufacturing operations means a corresponding increase in the number of accidents to
the wage-workers employed therein" (Moseley). At the time of the speech, the United
States was in the fifth decade ofrapidly increasing accident frequency. One worker in
every fiftywas killed or disabled for aminimum of four weeks each year in the
workplace, contrasted with one death among each one thousand accident among the
general population (Hoffman). In dangerous industries such as railroads, one in every
three hundred suffered workplace deaths; for railroad brakemen the ratio was one in every
hundred (Aldrich). In the coal mines of 1850's and 1860's Pennsylvania, six percent of
the workforce was killed, six percent was permanently crippled, and six percent suffered
temporary disabilities every year (BLS, Colorado). Estimates for non-fatal accidents for
this period are too sketchy to confirm (Witt).
Roosevelt went on to day that, "for the ordinary
wage-workers'family, such a
calamitymeans grim
hardship" (Witt). Given that the work out ofwhich such an accident
arose was "done for the employer, and therefore ultimately for the public, it is a bitter
injustice that it should be the wage-worker himselfand his wife and children who bear
the whole penalty" (Witt). The principles ofcommon law, which generally required the
employee to prove the employer's negligence caused his injury, were approximately 70
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years old by this time. Judges had decided that workers had to assume the risks
characteristic of their occupations (Witt).
In his speech, President Roosevelt suggested, "workmen should receive a certain,
definite, and limited compensation for all accidents arising as an incident of the
performance of their duties," regardless of the negligence of the employer. He felt this
would induce employers to take greater care and thereby reduce the number ofaccidents.
He also thought it would be a step toward equitable treatment for everyone (Proud ofHis
Ancestry, 1907).
Roosevelt's speech raised new and important questions about new risks in the
relatively "free
labor"
country as a result of the Civil War. The next day's newspaper
sub-headline, referring to the speech read "Automatic Indemnity for Personal
Injury"
(Proud ofHis Ancestry, 1907). The issues that Roosevelt raised during this speech
became and remain the substance ofbusiness, economics, law, and politics even to this
day. In fact, in his book, The Accidental Republic, John Fabian Witt (2000) suggests that
industrial accidents gave rise to several experiments in social, institutional, and legal
reforms and industries. Witt sees a connection between industrial accidents and the
development of tort law, the growth of the insurance industry and industrial labor leaders.
Where the end of the Civil War raised questions about the distinctions between free labor
and slavery, the industrial accident crisis thatRoosevelt spoke of raised the issues of risk,
security, and insurance (Witt).
Between 1909 and 1913, twenty-eight states conducted studies of the industrial
accident problem. By 1920, compensation systems such as that suggested by Roosevelt
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were established in 42 states. In America, accident law was largely experimental and
developmental at the start of the twentieth century (Witt).
Unintentional injury received little attention in eighteenth century England and
almost none in the United States (Bartrip, Burman). Private contractual relations were the
framework on which the legal system was based. At that time, cases considered tort cases
today were handled as contractual cases. Ofcourse, there were issues that fell outside the
parameters ofpure contractual relations such as husband and wife or master and servant
relations. Cases were generally categorized as property or contractual, although there
were some civil remedies for non-contractual personal wrongs. In fact the Code of
Hammurabi, written in 2000 BC, included a schedule ofdamages that an injurer had to
pay the injured:
. . . carelessness and neglect were severely punished, as in the case of the unskillful
physician. If the negligence led to loss of life or limb, his handswere cut off, a
slave had to be replaced, the loss ofhis eye paid for to halfhis value; a veterinary
surgeon who caused the death of an ox or ass paid quarter value; a builder, whose
careless workmanship caused death, lost his life or paid for it by the death ofhis
child, replaced slave or goods, and in any case had to rebuild the house ormake
good any damages due to defective building and repair the defect as well. The
boat-builder had to make good any defect ofconstruction or damage due to it for a
year's warranty. (Avalon)
According to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, "there are two-categories ofnon
voluntary action. Ifan action is caused by ignorance, it is non-voluntary. Ifan action is
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caused by ignorance and is regretted, then the action is involuntary. We are responsible for
what we do voluntarily, even under duress. We are responsible for our character and for
some types of ignorance that arise through negligence" (Aristotle). The early Roman
Twelve Tables established compensation for injury. Table VflT.2 of the Roman Tables
indicates:
Ifone has maimed a limb and does not compromisewith the injured person, let
there be retaliation. Ifone has broken a bone ofa freemanwith his hand orwith a
cudgel, let him pay a penalty of three hundred coins. Ifhe has broken the bone of
a slave, let him have one hundred and fifty coins. Ifone is guilty of insult, the
penalty shall be twenty-five coins. (Thatcher)
Even the Bible's Old Testament reflects a dynamic for restitution,most
remembered by Exodus 21:23-25, "but if any lasting harm follows, then you shall give
life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, bum for burn, wound
for wound, stripe for
stripe." Likewise, Leviticus 24:19 states, "ifaman causes
disfigurement ofhis neighbor, as he has done, so shall it be done to him."
These reflections of restitution deal with wrongful harms, generally on an
individual basis. Industrial accidents due to the size of industry and the degree of injuries
and deaths have caused the restitution issue to rise to societal levels requiring societal
remedies. To this day, the theory of torts appears to be built around individual personal
remedies rather than the problem of"compensation for unintentional human injuries
generated on a mass scale by the regular operations ofeconomic life. . (Witt).
The types of accidents also changedwith industrialization and the growth ofthe
railroad andmining industries. Accident rates increased dramatically and catastrophic
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incidents became more common. Personal injury litigation was developed and litigation
rates skyrocketed (Witt). For the first time, middle and working-class people purchased
life insurance on awidespread basis. New insurance companies began to write separate
insurance polices for railway passengers. Supreme Court Justice OliverWendell Holmes
Jr., was a primary developer of the theory of torts and personal interactions in 1881
(Witt). By 1897, Holmes observed that "the torts withwhich our courts are kept busy
today aremainly the incidents of certain well known businesses. They are injuries to
person or property by railroads, factories and the like" (quoted inWitt).
2.3 Learning from England
In the book, The Wounded Soldiers of Industry, Industrial Compensation Policy,
1833-1897, by P.W.J. Bartrip and S.B. Burman, (1983) the case is made that there is no
recorded High Court case in Britain, in which an employee sued his employer for
damages as a result of a workplace injury. This was important because much of the
dynamic in the United States regarding the progressivity ofworkmen's compensation was
drawn from British and European experiences. In this work, the political dynamics of
workmen's compensation in Britain are described as almost the same as the tortuous
transition of the United States and had as great an impact on British society. It was seen
as the first installment of social welfare reforms and laid the foundation of the Welfare
State in England. Although the political battle began in 1833, the act was not enacted
officially in England until 1897 (Bartrip, Burman).
While the debate in the United Stateswas basically restricted to workmen's
compensation, England saw the issuemore immediately as an extensive program of social
welfare reform (Cullen). JohnMunkman states, "it was based on an entirely new
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principle"- that is, no - fault liability (Mukman). A.F. Young (1975) argued that the
passing of the Actwas the culmination ofa debate between two groups. On one side
were those who wanted to improve industrial safety by burdening employers with liability
in the event of accidents, thereby giving them a financial incentive to improve safety. On
the other side were those who preferred to concentrate on providing relief for injured
men. Essentially, the debate was between those that sawworkmen's compensation as a
way to improve safety versus an avenue of relief for injured men. The compensationists
prevailed, and the legislation veered towards reliefof the injured rather than promotion of
safety (Young).
Britain also made several attempts to resolve industry-specific injury and death
problems. Those attempts included the establishment of the Factory andMines Acts,
through the RailwayRegulation Acts, the Employers' LiabilityAct of 1880, and the
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 (Bartrip, Burman). Its beginnings in Britain had
more to dowith the country's transition from an agricultural society to an industrialized
one. As in the United States, pictures ofmaimed, wounded, and crippled workers and
those ofdestitute widows and children had amajor impact on the conscience of the nation
(Bartrip, Burman).
The issue of safety in Britain and the United States is creditedwith the birth of the
use of statistics. There was a need to quantify social problems or changes that arose as a
result of industrialization (Cullen). In Britain, inspectors were also a part ofthe
workman's compensation plan and were given the authority to classify as dangerous, any
machinery that was not fenced in. Inspectors were also authorized to issue fines.
Although safetywas a primary driver for the establishment ofworkmen's compensation,
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fatality statistics did not verify its effectiveness (Bartrip, Burman). Britain did draw a
correlation between workmen's compensation and economic deterrence brought about by
the cost of insurance, but the cost was spread such thatmerit based rating was not
confirmed until 1920 (Bartrip, Burman). In the United States, there was much more
experimentation with merit rating. The impact ofworkmen's compensation in the social
conscience occurred in Britain as it did in the United States Workmen's compensation
was "the pioneer system of social security" (Social Insurance and Allied Services).
The defining characteristics ofAmerican systems ofmanufacturing are high-
powered machinery and production ofgoods with interchangeable parts. The new
technology ofwater and, later, steam-poweredmachines replaced the older and more
labor-intensive methods, increasing production significantly (Witt). Speculation was that
these changes worsened the safety ofwork based on twentieth century loss data. ". . .In
every industry the substitution ofmechanical devices formanual methods has introduced
corresponding elements of
danger" (Travelers Insurance). Business stressed that
workmen's compensation would stimulate accident prevention. Magnus Alexander of
General Electric was applauded when he indicated thatworkmen's compensationmust be
"preventive, punitive, educative and certain" (Schwedtman). More important to business
executives was that lawsuits due to employers' liability poisoned relations with their
workers and led to class warfare (Aldrich). The National Association ofManufacturers
officially described
employers'liability as "antagonistic to harmonious relations between
employers and
wage-workers."America led the world in productivity, but as
Commissioner ofLabor Charles P. Neill observed when speaking to the National Safety
Council in 1913, American industry also was preeminent in the world in the "maiming
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andmangling and killing of those who attempt to earn their bread in the sweat of their
faces" (Aldrich).
Germany had implemented a no-fault workmen's compensation system in 1884,
England adopted in 1897 (Aldrich), and American legislators visited to evaluate their
version ofno-fault compensation.
2.4 Materialists versus Idealists
In the Accidental Republic, by John FabianWitt, the case is made for the
development ofworkers' compensation based on the history as described thus far in this
document. "When tort liability threatened to become too great, states adopted workmen's
compensation statutes at the behest ofemployers to limit employee recovery in work-
accident
cases" (Witt). Witt refers to these historians as materialists in their theory
because they attribute the changes to responses to economic development. There are
other historians that credit the development ofworkers'compensation to idealists.
Idealists explain historical changes based on ideas, sociology, and deep-rooted traditions
rather than to the economy. Thus, for the idealist, the law oftorts consists of the duty of
"reasonable care" that each individual owed to the entire world and shifts toward
workers'
compensation occurred due to liberalized liability that expanded concepts of
causation and responsibility (Bergstrom).
Witt (2003) argues that neither materialist nor idealist approaches recognized the
opportunity for change thatwas instigated by the influx of industrial accidents because
both approaches placed too much concentration on the avenue of torts and ignored the
dynamic nature ofAmerican accident law in the early 1900s. In fact, labor leaders in the
United States began to draw on the experiences ofEurope during the 1870s and 1880s,
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studying German approaches to industrial accident policy, beginning with a study by the
Massachusetts Bureau ofStatistics ofLabor in 1872. German social scientists in turn
visited America to study insurance systems (Taussig).
2.5 Cultural Change - Slave Labor to Free Labor
As indicated earlier, the United States had to undergo amental/cultural change in
order to acceptworkers' compensation as a viable option. To a country built on rugged
individualism, the concept ofworkers' compensation and the group good for betterment
of society were quite foreign andmany legislators were resistant. The American legal
and political landscape were populated by figures ensconced in the problem ofwork-
accident law and reform.
As aNewYork legislator, Franklin Roosevelt was actively involved in the issue
of
workers'
compensation; Charles Evans Hughes, ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court
during theNewDeal, signed into law the first work-accident statute in 1910, when he was
the governor ofNew York (Witt). George Sutherland, a conservative on theNew Deal
Supreme Court, chaired a 1912 commission that recommendedworkmen's compensation
for railroad workers (Witt). Pierce Butler, another conservative on that Supreme Court
also favored workmen's compensation (Witt). Frances Perkins, Secretary ofLabor (New
Deal), pushed forworkmen's compensation after the 191 1 Triangle Shirtwaist Fire that
killed 146 employees (Witt). Huey Long began his legal career as an attorney in
Louisiana fighting compensation cases as a
plaintiffs'lawyer (Witt).
The number ofAmericans involved inworkmen's compensation cases began to
grow significantly. By 1917, 68 percent of the nation's workforce - approximately 13
million workers - were covered byworkmen's compensation statutes (Witt). By 1930, in
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New York alone, over 200,000 new claims were submitted annually (Witt). Witt makes
the point that the involvement ofmillions ofAmericans in workmen's compensation also
changed social policy in the United States. Other innovations such as unemployment
insurance paid for by employers to handle company-sponsored layoffs, the Social
Security Act, workmen's compensation statutes of the early 1900s, and common actuarial
data and techniques were used for many social programs (Witt).
The influence ofworkmen's compensation on society stretched beyond
government programs to influence new human resources philosophies, management of
work-accident benefits, and bureaucracies built around benefit management, claims
handling, and investigations. The impact on health insurancewas also significant.
The era ofaccident-law reform thus stood as one of those seminal
moments ofpossibility in American politics, one of those punctuations in
the equilibria ofnormal politics: a critical juncture in which the future of
American law and policywas open to a number ofdifferent possible lines
ofdevelopment. Its outcomes helped shape the developmental path for
American social policy in the century to come. (Hacker)
Interestingly, Wittmakes the point thatAmerica had to firstmake the transition of
ideology from slave labor to free labor:
...[F]ree labor ideology in the mid-nineteenth century organized important
areas ofAmerican political and legal thought around the polar opposition
of free labor to slave labor, marking out a diverse array ofvirtues that were
said to distinguish the former from the latter - virtues such as autonomy,
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independence, efficiency and domesticity. . . . free labor came to influence
powerfully the politics and law of the United States.
Abraham Lincoln described free labor as "the inspiration ofhope," promising
opportunity for "advancement and improvement in
condition,"
and ensuring there would
be no "permanent class"of laborers, either slave or hireling (1861). Many on the Union
side of the Civil War said that the war was "for the establishment of free labor" (Basler).
The Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude, was said
to be the enshrinement of free labor in the nation's fundamental laws (Witt).
The initial problem with free labor philosophy is that
"risk"
was not part of its
definition. With the advent of industrialization, the inclusion ofrisk in the calculation of
free labor became unavoidable. In his speech before the 1907 Jamestown Exposition,
Theodore Roosevelt warned that the nation had outgrown the perils of the founding
fathers, "we now face other perils, the very existence ofwhich itwas impossible that they
should foresee. Modem life is both complex and intense, and the tremendous changes
wrought by the extraordinary industrial development ofthe last halfcentury are felt in
every fiber ofour social and political
being." In 1930, Roosevelt's cousinmade security
from "risk" amajor part of theNew Deal (Witt). Witt theorizes that theNew Deal
changed the issue from free labor as the chiefphilosophy driving labor regulation to wage
earners'risk and insurance, which eventually led to the demise of the free labor paradigm
(Witt).
2.6 CivilWar
Dr. Isaac A. Hourwich, in testimony before the U.S. Industrial Commission
(1900), stated:
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A certain number of lives are inevitably lost in the course ofour modem
industry-you cannot prevent it...Now,...that being the case the proposition
should be treated in a brutally frank manner, in the same way as it would
be treated in the old days of slavery. Ifa slave was injured, it was so much
injury to the owner of the slave. Ofcourse, we are today free, but,
practically speaking, there is always a certain danger attendant upon
industrial employment.
The Civil War was still fresh in theminds ofAmericans at the end of the
nineteenth century and beginning ofthe twentieth century. During the Civil War,
100,000 Union soldiers died and 400,000 sufferedwounds; 50,000 Confederate soldiers
died. Disease and sickness during the war accounted for 600,000 deaths. The deaths and
injuries from thewar led to the nation's first experiments in pubic policy for disability
and injury in peacetime. Americans observed that industrial accidents causedmore death
and injury than the Civil War. President Benjamin Harrison, in his first message to
Congress in 1889, announced thatAmerican railroad workers were subject "to a peril of
life and limb as great as that ofa soldier in time ofwar" (Minnesota Employees
Compensation Commission). In 191 1, work accident reformers in Iowa concluded that
the annual casualty list in peaceful industries "equals the average yearly casualties of the
American Civil War, plus all of those of the Philippine War, plus all those of the Russo-
Japanese War" (Downey). One reformer observed that the nation seemed to be
developing an "army ofcripples"(Rubinow).
Workingmen's and labor organizations reasoned that ifdisabled soldiers received
pensions, so too should the soldiers of the industrial army. "Is not the industrial soldier of
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more real value to the nation than the soldier?" (UnitedMine Workers). The first year
that the national census counted deaths from accidents in the United States, from bums,
drowning, scalding, and other was 1850. The other types ofaccidents data (railroad,
mining, machinery, falling bodies) were collected over the next several decades, therefore
accident data is inaccurate and difficult to compare (BLS 1900). However, workplace
injuries were the leading category ofaccidental death and injury by the twentieth century,
representing almost one-third ofall accidental deaths and one-half to two-thirds of
accidental injuries (Rubinow, Hoffman). Accident data for some specific industries such
as railroad, mining, and textile were extraordinarily high and received the nation's
attention. One United States Department ofLabor investigator explained, "the
introduction ofhigh power and complicated machinery has resulted in the increase in the
number and severity of
accidents." In 1864, the Traveler's Insurance Company became
the first to start this line ofbusiness in the United States (Pitcher).
2.7 Employers' Liability
The degree ofaccidental injury and death in the United States was significantly
higher than in European countries (Rubinow 1913). This was attributed to the influx of
immigrants into United States industries, language barriers, miscommunication,
unfamiliarity with newmachinery and processes, long distances covered by railroads that
made inspections difficult, America's less powerful trade unionmovement, and lax
employer liability laws. John Mitchell of the United Mine Workers ofAmerica argued
"if, as in Europe, it costs more to kill men here in America than to protect them, one half
as many would be killed in the dangerous
trades" (NewYork Times, 1910). The Mine
Workers'
concurred "to us, it appears that lack oforganization...togetherwith no
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compensation law, or efficientemployers'liability law, are the prime factors in our high
death rate inmills, mines, and
factories" (United Mine Workers, 1910).
Employers' liability was still not a full "no-fault" compensation plan for workers.
John Gitterman, a journalist in 1910, explained:
In contrast to the slave-law approach, the American principle is briefly
this: if the workingman objects to some dangerous task, he has the
privilege of throwing up his job. He is not a slave - he cannot be
compelled to work under hazardous conditions....Ifhe scalds to death
under his boiler, or has his head scraped offwhile attempting to couple
cars-he and his widow and orphan children. . .must suffer the
consequences."(Blackstone Commentaries, 2000)
By the close of the century, many economists believed that absent some
employers' liability program that imposed significant accident costs on employers, the
free play ofcompetition among firms would drive employers to nunimize their
investments in expensive safetymeasures. In otherwords, business competition
inexorably drove down working conditions. Nine often employers might seek to uphold
decent safety standards in industry. But if the tenth lacked such scruples, the industry
would find itselfcaught in a race to the bottom until all remaining employers in the
industry put theirworkers'lives at risk (Adams). Howell Cheney ofConnecticut argued
in 1910 that the forces ofcompetition had exaggerated the dangerous pressure and speed
of industry, pushing industrial accident rates ever higher (Cheney 1910).
Many employers that supported workmen's compensation over
employers'
liability did so in spite ofoverwhelming evidence that itwould increase their costs.
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Insurance experts estimated that costs would be increased by "two and a quarter or two
and a half times." By this time (191 1), the railroads already had two years experience
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which curtailedmuch of the
carriers'
defenses. The change to workmen's compensation costmore but a 1912 study of railroad
experience showed that payment for death still averaged less than was contemplated by
any of the workmen's compensation laws (Dawson). On this matter, MarkAldrich
indicates:
Workmen's compensation generated safety incentives because ofthe
accident costs it imposed on employers, and these in turn depended on the
benefits paid injured workers. Initially benefits were extremelymodest,
due to the need for employer support and because itwas thought thatmore
adequate payments would promote malingering. Thus, most states
provided no compensation for injuries resulting in less than one
(sometimes two) weeks ofdisability. Compensationwas usually half to
two-thirds of lostwages, betweenmaximums andminimums.
Compensation for death depended on the number of survivors, but it too
was limited, usually to no more than $3,000-5,000. (Aldrich).
At first, the ideawas to apply average rates to all firms within a risk category.
However, this seemed to present less incentive for accident prevention because a
company's premiumwas independent of its injury rate. As Harvey Kelly, ofWashington
State's BLS, told the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and
Commissions in 1920, "the careful employer, who cuts his accident cost to the minimum
through safeguarding and safety educational work found his efforts nullified by the
Eure 28
careless employer. . . . Both paid the same rate for insurance" (Kelly). Some type ofmerit
rating was necessary and the State ofOhio pioneered experience rating. Under
experience rating, a company's premium depended upon its past injury record. A second
form of rating, called schedule rating, gave discounts to companies that followed state
safety codes, guarded machines, or made other safety improvements recommended by the
insurance carrier. In spite of incentives to correct specific hazards, companies felt that a
management systems approach would be more fruitful in accident reduction (Kelly).
Ofcourse, the lion's share ofaccidents was attributed to worker carelessness. The
notion that accidents in the workplace were caused by the negligence of the employee was
the favorite refuge of scoundrel employers, often even in cases in which the employer had
- or could have had - a significant degree ofmanagerial control over the relevant aspect of
the work process (United MineWorkers). Some critics saw in free labor or wage labor "a
more perfect
compulsion" thanwas slavery (Fitzbah); others argued that labormarkets
reduced the wage worker to the dependent condition of"wage slavery"(Stanley).
2.8 Side Affects
Another group felt that greater results in safety efforts would be realized by
reinforcing standards with legal requirements. Regulatory commissions were formed in
an effort to regulate workplace safety. In 1923, regulations were inconsistent from state
to state. North and South Carolina had no legislation at all; Florida and Georgia regulated
only the employment ofwomen and children. In other states, most common laws were
limited to requiring building exits, electrical code, andmines. Only two states without a
commission coveredmachine tools or punch presses; one state regulated cranes, but none
controlled use ofcompressed air (Fishback, Kantor). State regulations and inspections
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followed, but there were never enough inspectors. Iowa had one inspector for 15,000
shops and factories. Indiana had four inspectors for 18,000 workplaces andMinnesota
had five inspectors for 1 1,000 facilities; other states were similarly staffed (Minnesota,
IowaBLS).
Standardization of safety codes remained a consistent problem. Insurance
company inspectors needed standard guidelines fromwhich to recommend improvement.
In 1918, theNational Bureau ofStandards sponsored two conferences on standardization
of safety codes, then the issue was passed on to the American Engineering Standards
Committee (Fishback, Kantor). Most of the codes were voluntary, but companies were
reticent about complying with voluntary standards - legislationwas necessary. The
Bureau ofLabor Statistics was engaged to set parameters around what was acceptable
when it came to risk, and they did so using a body of statistics (Fishback, Kantor). The
Bureau also defined a disabling injury as one that resulted in at least one lost work day
(Fishback, Kantor). Then it introduced the method
started by the German Insurance Commission ofexpressing injury frequency rates in
terms ofhours ofexposure. This method was widely adopted (Fishback, Kantor). The
Bureau next started a comparative data program. Companies that paid no attention to
safety, took notice when statistics revealed they were in the bottom halfof their industry
(Fishback, Kantor). Statistics also allowed a rational approach to accident prevention and
allocation of resources.
Some stateworkers'compensation boards began accident prevention activities in
response to employer demand for information. TheMassachusetts IndustrialAccident
Board published safety booklets, produced pictures, and advised employers regarding
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accident causation and encouraged insurance companies to do the same (Fishback,
Kantor). Shortly thereafter, the safety initiative was given to state boards and the activity
died out while safety orders became prominent. Nearly everyone acknowledged that
workmen's compensation had awakened the interest ofcorporate management to safety,
butmost of the individuals who comprised the safetymovement were notmotivated by
costs or profits. Business leaders saw safety as an issue ofeconomics rather thanmorals
(Fishback, Kantor).
2.9 State or Private Insurance
Insurance companies had an interest in accident prevention that raised the issue to
levels not seen before, particularly during the employers'liability phase. Insurance
companies developed specialized expertise in engineering and inspection services that
few employers could match (Aldrich). Insurance companies carried safety specialization
to the extremewith "trademutuals,"such as LumbermansMutual, formed to compensate
only for lumber and woodworking injuries. HardwareMutual was another; laundry
operators set up
Empoyers' Indemnity Exchange; IntegrityMutual was an insurer of flour
mills. In 1913, Aetna informed the Massachusetts Industrial Commission that "they had
increased the efficiency of its inspection service to a considerable
degree." In 1915,
Travelers had 220 inspectors that performed 235,000 inspections, or about 3-1/2 per day.
Shortly, insurers developed safety packages for their clients. On average, from 1923
through 1939, insurance companies spent approximately 2.8 percent of their earned
premiums or $4.8 million per year on safety related activities (Cincinatti Study of
Workman's Compensation). Carriers also set up clinics andmanaged health treatments.
IntegrityMutual developed industrial surgery in Chicago. Insurers also conducted safety
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research, developing machine guards, evaluating chemicals, and providing expertise for
those industries within which they specialized (Aldrich).
Most importantly, insurers claimed their safety work obtained results and
presented statistics and graphs demonstrating declines in injury rates for companies that
complied with their safety recommendations. Additionally, as cause and prevention of
accidents was studied, the conclusion that injuries resulted from professional or
managerial failure rather than worker carelessness represented a surprising reversal of
earlier beliefs (Aldrich).
2.10 Group Good
At the start of the twentieth century, workplace
accidents were the leading cause of incapacity among
working-age men in railroad, mining, logging, timber,
bricklaying, andmasonry work . This was also true of
boys and women as shown in the picture by Lewis
Hines who created a photographic essay ofmissing
limbs and vacant stares ofdestitute familymembers of
workingmen in Pittsburgh. Accidents accounted for
five times as many deaths among men between 15 and
45 years ofage as among women of similar age.
Consequently, families were often left destitute by the
accidental injury or death ofamale wage earner.
Fig. 1. Photograph ofa
worker who lost his left arm
in a workplace accident
(Hines).
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Fig. 2. Picture ofa boy that
lost his arm while operating a
saw in a factory (Hines).
Fig. 3. Picture ofa widow and destitute family from a
cotton mill accident (Hines).
Photos such as these startled the nation's viewers and increased pressure to
change the system. John Mitchell, a UnitedMine Workers leader, called compensation
for industrial-accident victims "the most urgent practical measure" in the field of social
reform (Mitchell). Samuel Gompers of the American Federation ofLabor asserted that
"compensation for the victims of injury, stood above all other issues in terms of its
legislative significance; no other issue was ofhalf the
importance" (Gompers Speech
1910).
The battle between progressive group good and conservative survival of the fittest
found itsmidpoint in common law. OliverWendell Holmes explained in his 1881 The
Common Law that, "loss from accidentmust he where it
falls." The meaning ofaccident
in this case meant "without fault." The law could have opted to divide the damages
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between equally faultless or equally at-fault actors. Yet the law allowed plaintiffs to
recover damages only when they could prove that the defendant's fault or negligence
caused their injury and that they had not contributed to that injury by their own fault or
negligence. In other words, "purely accidental harms lay where they
fell" (Holmes). The
problem here was that there would be many injuries that fell between negligence and
strict liability. There were injuries inwhich the employee was not at fault and the
employer had not been negligent. These types ofaccidents fell into the category of
damnum absque injuria, or loss without a legal remedy (the harm lays where it fell)
(Holmes).
Many saw an economic problem at the suggestion of strict liability compensation
for employers. New York Judge Robert Earl actually said with regard to the economic
effects of strict liability or no fault compensation, "wemust have factories, machinery,
dams, canals and railroads"(Holmes). The suggestion being that the nation's entire
economic infrastructure would collapse. This attitude left the remedy of lawsuits to
resolve worker accident issues and the number of lawsuits grew. The number ofaccident
cases shot up after 1870; between 1870 and 1890, the number ofaccident suits in
litigation inNew York City alone grew almost eightfold. By 1910, the number of related
lawsuits grew again by five times. Tort cases inNew York grew from 4.2 percent in
1870 to 40.9 percent of the caseload by 1910 (Bergstrom). E. Parmalee Prentice, writing
in theNorth American Review, found an 800 percent increase in lawsuits in Cook
County, Illinois between 1875 and 1896 (1907).
Another realization became important in the transition through fault and no-fault
concepts. Many lawsuits were from accident victims who, themselves, were faultless. It
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became clear that "injuries were the inevitable result ofmodem industrial
As OliverWendell Holmes would say, "the faultless victim ofnon-negligent
injury."
This was a significant departure from the nineteenth century concept of contributory
negligence that said any portion of fault by the injured party would eliminate the chance
for recovery (Cooley).
2.1 1 Tort, Strict Liability, and Fault
In between traditional tort and full strict liability, fell cause-based strict liability
standards. However, some accidents were bilateral in causation, so the issue of fault was
again too difficult to determine. Over time, the traditionally dominant negligence
standard began to coexist withmixed levels of strict liability, but never a full no-fault
strict liability. By 191 1, 25 states had enacted some type of legislation that abolished the
fellow-servant rule, therebymodifying the contributory negligence doctrine and limiting
the assumption ofrisk mles (Witt). The Federal Employers' LiabilityAct of 1906 also
abolished the fellow servant rule for railroad workers (Larson). By the 1930's almost
everyAmerican jurisdiction had replaced tort lawwith an administrative compensation
system forwork accidents (Witt). In 1910 and 1911, workmen's compensation statutes
cancelled the resolution ofdamnum absque injuria, replacing it with a scheme aimed at
shifting the cost ofno-fault injuries to employers (Witt).
Workers'
compensation, along
with changes in insurance pools, actually substituted insurance benefits for tort actions
against employers. The insurance element and inclusion ofeveryone in the workers'
compensation plan also eliminated the competitive advantage ofcompanies not
participating and rewarded safe workplaces through reduced compensation costs
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(Fishback, Kantor). Even more positively, this move seemed to shift the responsibility of
safety from the employee to the employer.
Between 1910 and 1920, more than 48 states enacted some form of
workers'
compensation. In 1925, only five states in the deep South were without a
workers'
compensation program (Witt). Part ofwhat drove the changes was the concept of
protecting the family wage by protecting the income of the wage earner. A workingman
free to be injured at work was aworkingman at risk ofnot being able to support his wife
and children. Thus, industrial accidents slowly undid free labor's distinction between
home and work. In her bookWork-Accidents and the Law. Crystal Eastman approached
the problem ofworkplace accidents from the perspective of the "home." This meant
describingworkplace accidents in the context ofwidows, children, and families - similar
to the photos by Lewis Hines. The United States Department ofLabor published studies
of"the effect ofworkers'compensation laws in diminishing the necessity of industrial
employment ofwomen and
children" (Conyngton). It is ironic that this only referred to
women who were widows ofworking men. In the event ofa woman's death at work, the
husband could not file a claim. At that time, workmen's compensation was literally
workmen 's compensation, not workers
'
compensation. This asymmetrical gender balance
was virtually unchallenged through the 1970s. In 1980, the United States Supreme Court
struck this idea down as unconstitutional sex discrimination (Mutual Insurance).
The fight forworkers' compensationwas not an easy one.
Workers'
compensation was labeled "revolutionary, radical and
collectivist." It was called "a step
in the dark"(Minnesota Report 191 1) andwas viewed as "unjust"(New York Times
1911), "radical"(Tripp 1976), and socialistic. One Washington State merchant even
Eure 36
called it "freak legislation" (Minnesota Report). Subtly, the workplace accident debate
shifted from the ideology of free labor towards actuarial evaluation and combined risks.
Importantly for EHS managers, the workmen's compensation movement
coalesced with the claims of the first generation ofmanagerial engineers. Scientific
managers would best be able to create systems designed to minimize the yearly toll of
industrial accidents (Calabresi). Making employers responsible was "the key to the
prevention of industrial injuries" (Downey). Ultimately, the mental transformation that
the nation underwent to accept the strict liability version ofworkers'compensation,
seems to have led to new conceptions ofsocial responsibility. Other issues such as
pensions for soldiers, unemployment insurance, industry specific compensation for
railroad workers andminers, social security, and the general "social remedy of
insurance,"
also were impacted (Ohio Report). But although thinking began to change,
history has shown that further social insurance and expansion oftheworkers'
compensation paradigm did not occur until after the 1970s (Witt).
2.12 Workers' Compensation
Soon after the enactment ofworkers' compensation statutes, workplace injuries
began to decline. Economists disagree broadly as to the reasons for the reduction.
However, whether because ofchanged employer accident costs orwidespread public
attention to workplace accidents, workmen's compensation brought in the first
widespread safetymovement in theAmericanworkplace. From 1907 to 1920, workplace
fatality rates per man-hour dropped by two-thirds and non-fatal accidents decreased by
one-half. AtUnited States Steel, rates fell from 1 :4 per year in 1907 to 1:300 by 1939
(Aldrich).
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By 1917, 13.5 million American wage earners were covered by some type of
compensation program, which was approximately 69 percent of the total paid workforce.
By 1917, there were more than 350,000 claims per year (Hookstadt). Lloyd Harger,
Division ofWorkers Compensation for the State ofFlorida, provides a "history of
workers'
compensation timeline," as follows:
O 1850 Factories Act (13&14 Vict.., c.54) amended the Act of 1847 by stating the
times betweenwhich young people and women could be employed in factories
and raised the total hours they could work to 60 perweek.
o 1855 United States, Georgia passed Employer LiabilityAct in the state legislature.
26 other states passed similar acts between 1855 and 1907. These acts were
simply permission to sue the employer ifemployee proved a negligent act or
omission.
O 1861-1865 United States Civil War, Industrialization in theNorth for the war
effort. When the war ends, factories converted frommanufacturing uniforms to
regular clothing. Birth of the infamous "sweatshops."
o 1880 England, Parliament passed "Employer's Liability Act."
O 1 884 Germany passed "Industry Compensation Act."
O 1897 England repealed "Employer's LiabilityAct" and replaced it with a
"WorkingMan's CompensationAct."
O 1 898 New York, theNew York Social Club drafted a bill for "Partial
Compensation forWorkers." No action taken by state legislature. Largest
opponent is labor unions.
o 1901 Maryland passes legislation for a "Cooperative Accident Insurance Fund."
O 1905 Maryland Act ruled "unconstitutional" by state Supreme Court.
O 1908 Massachusetts passed legislation establishing private plans for
compensation. Never signed by the governor and passed into obscurity.
o 1908 Coal Mines InspectionAct introduced the appointment of inspectors ofcoal
mines and set out their powers and duties.
o 1908 Federal Employer's Liability Act passed by the United States Congress at the
urging ofPresident Theodore Roosevelt. This is the first
"workman's"
compensation law in the United States. Congress passed the Federal Employees;
LiabilityAct (FELA) in 1908, to provide compensation to railroad employees who
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are injured on the job. FELA enabled injured employees to bring claims directly
against their employers where it can be shown that it was the railroad's negligence
that caused the injury. Unlike "no fault" workers'compensations laws, under
which an injured worker does not need to establish any fault by the employer, a
claim brought under FELA had to show that the railroad was somehow negligent
and caused the injuries. Under FELA, a railroader was not entitled to recover
damages from the railroad for an injury merely because ofan on-duty. Under
FELA, a railroad company had a duty to:
Ensure that the workplace is reasonably free ofunsafe conditions and
safety hazards,
Warn employees ofany unsafe conditions and hazards, even in situations
where the employee himself should be aware of the danger, and
Inspect the workplace to make sure it is free ofknown and unknown
hazards.
All injuries sustained in the course ofemployment are covered by the Federal
Employer's LiabilityAct. There are four basic types of injuries covered:
1. Sudden and traumatic injuries - such as broken bones, back strains, pulled
muscles and tendons, and lacerations.
2. Repetitive stress injuries - such as carpal tunnel syndrome, tendonitis, and
hearing loss.
3. Aggravation ofpre-existing conditions - such as when a
workers'
accident
aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing physical condition or injury, it is
considered a new injury under FELA.
4. Occupational diseases - such as lung cancer, skin diseases, and asbestos
related diseases.
1910New York, legislature passed a partial "workman's" compensation act.
O 191 1 New York Court ofAppeals ruled that the Act is "unconstitutional."
2.13 Transition -1911
1911 was an important year as New York adopted its first safety codes and
Wisconsin adopted a true workman's compensation law. Thus, 1911 has been selected as
a transition year for this thesis. Importantly, the change inNew York appears to have
been driven by the catastrophe of the Triangle Shirtwaist Company Fire. Just prior to the
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fire, New York resisted workers' compensation legislation, viewing it as unconstitutional.
Harger continues his workers' compensation chronology as follows:
o 1911 New York, Triangle Shirtwaist Company Fire inNew York City, over 146
workers jump to their deaths to escape fire in a 10-story building. Exits were
blocked, many lawsuits. Entire nation shocked at this tragedy. NewYork City
immediately adopts first safety codes.
1911 Wisconsin becomes first state in the Union to adopt a hue "workman's"
compensation law. Called the "Great Trade Off"; employersprovide coverage,
employees give up right to sue.
o 1912 Fourmore states pass laws regarding workplace safety.
o 1913 Eightmore states adopt legislation regarding workplace safety.
o 1915 Alaska and Hawaii pass "workman's" compensation laws even though they
are only territories.
1935 Florida passes "Workman's" Compensation Law."
o 1938 First Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule.
1948 All states in the Union have "Workman's" Compensation Laws.
1955 Special Disability Trust Fund created.
1955 Rehabilitation andMedical Services Section established in the Bureau of
"Workman's" Compensation.
o 1979 Florida, firstmajor reform since 1935. "Workman's" Compensation now
called
"Workers" Compensation; many sweeping changes; wage loss concept
adopted replacing fixed-benefit system. Division of
Workers' Compensation
established within the new Department ofLabor and Employment Security.
1990 Florida, additional reform, Bureau ofWorkers' Compensation Fraud
established in Department of Insurance, Division ofFraud.
1990 Florida, Drug-Free Workplace added to law, first in the United States.
1990 Bureau ofSafety in the Division of
Workers' Compensation upgraded to full
division status within the Department ofLabor and Employment Security.
1993 Florida,Major ReformAct, Wage Loss eliminated, new Impairment Income
and Supplemental Benefits, Managed Care, Chiropractic care limits, Employee
Assistance and Ombudsman Office created alongwith other changes.
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o 1999 Special Disability Trust Fund abolished by legislation. Division ofSafety
also abolished effective July 1, 2000.
O 2000 Department ofLabor and Employment and Employment Security
abolishment begins with various Divisions including Jobs and Benefits and
Unemployment Compensation renamed and transferred to other State Agencies.
o 2002 Abolishment of the Department ofLabor and Employment Security
completed through legislation. Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA)
receives Medical Services Section ofDivision ofWorker's Compensation Bureau
ofRehabilitation andMedical Services. Rehabilitation portion transferred to
Department ofEducation. Remainder ofDivision transferred to Department of
Insurance effective July 1, 2002.
2003 Department of Insurance and Department ofBanking and Finance merge
into one new agency, the Department ofFinancial Services effective January 1,
2003.
o 2003 Major Reform Act, changes to Permanent Total Disability, Permanent Total
Supplement, Permanent Partial Benefits, Practice Parameters and Protocols
mandatory inmedical care, changes to Independent Medical Examinations,
Attorney Fee Award structure, Compliance, Exemptions, elimination of
Supplemental Benefits and other legislative changes.
The inclusion of the 191 1 Triangle ShirtwaistCompany Fire, inNew York City,
which resulted in the deaths of 146 women and girls, was an importantmoment in the
evolution of
workers'
compensation. It was a factor inNewYork finally accepting the
principle of
workers'
compensation. Then Secretary ofLabor, Frances Perkins suggested
that the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire represented, "the first day of theNew Deal" (Perkins).
Unfortunately, the timing of the change also appears to substantiate the presumption that
it sometimes took large losses and deaths to significantly impact change.
The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire also changed the gender focus ofworkmen's
compensation (Witt). Prior to the fire, the industrial accident crisis was limited to the
male wage earner. The inclusion ofwomen and children, was important because it slowly
brought the issue of families, children and widows into the debate (Witt). Once the issues
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ofdestitute widows and children entered the debate, haunting pictures, such as those of
Lewis Hines, became important to the nation's conscience.
Between 191 1 and 1948, all states in the United States adopted
workers'
compensation laws. Amore importantmodem developmentmay be the 1990 upgrading
of the Bureau ofSafety in the Division ofWorkers' Compensation to full division status
within the Department ofLabor and Employment Security. Unfortunately, the time line
also reflects the abolishment of the Division ofSafety and redistribution of the
Department ofLabor and Employment Security in 2000 and legislative abolishment in
2002.
The 2003 merging of the Department of Insurance with the Department of
Banking and Finance, appears to reflect the validation of the conversion of insurance to a
financial apparatus for transfer of risk.
The 2003 Major Reform Act seeks to address the most current problems with
workers'
compensation - medical care costs and defining what medical options are
available to injured employees.
2.14 Mid-twentieth Century - Compensation, Tort, and Legal Summary
Witt suggests fourmajor approaches to the accident problem that emerged in the
United States in the second halfof the twentieth century: (1) The nation's courts created
the common law of torts; (2) workers organized wide-spread, although little known,
cooperative insurance societies; (3) some employers developed private employer
compensation programs; and, (4) social insurance advocates proposed the compulsory
accident-compensation schemes thatwere largely instituted after 1910.
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By the end of the 1930s, there were two systems -workers'compensation for
work accidents and tort for virtually the rest of the field. The societal concerns regarding
industrialization also influenced the courts' decisions. On January 3, 1916, Louis D.
Brandeis, who within a few weeks would be nominated to the Supreme Court of the
United States, said in a speech regarding industrial accidents, "the great increase in
American productive wealth had come at an enormous cost in humanmisery."Reformers
correlated a number ofproblems to the growth of industry, and devised various remedies
to protect workers, especiallywomen and children, from the malignant effects of factory
life. Protective legislation, including the establishment ofmaximum hours and minimum
wages, the abolition ofchild labor, and the creation ofworkmen's compensation programs
all aimed at redressing the perceived imbalance between the lords of industry and their ill-
used workers (Urofsky).
Writing for the Supreme Court Historical Society in 1983 in Myth and Reality:
The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive Era, Melvin I. Urofsky
agreed with
Brandeis'
comments regarding the sociological impact of industrialization,
stating that "the litany ofProgressive complaints derived from a basic assumption that
industrialization had so altered traditional economic and social relationships as to
endanger not only the health and welfare of laborers, but to undermine the moral and
political bases ofdemocracy"(Lieberman). To take but one example, reform investigators
discovered that the huge increase in the number ofwomen factory workers correlated
with a rise in prostitution, a decline in church-going, and a growing population dependant
upon charity. To the investigators, the reasons were clear. An 1884 Boston study,
coveringmore than one thousandworking women, found thatmost factory owners
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required them to work more than sixty hours a week and that commercial businesses
often demanded eighty-hour weeks, including Sundays, with no extra pay (Lieberman).
ANew York Labor Bureau study described in horrified terms the inadequate ventilation,
filthy sanitary facilities, and dangerous conditions inNew York sweatshops. As one
immigrant woman sadly told Lincoln Steffens, her young daughters wanted to become
prostitutes when they grew up, because the working conditions and paywere better than
in the factories (Lieberman, 1 93 1 ).
A similar concern marked the crusade against child labor, and in fact tied in
closely with the fight to improve women'sworking conditions (Urofsky). Women and
children constituted the heart ofthe family and the quality ofAmerica's next generation
would be adversely affected by the deprivations visited upon those employed for long
hours, in dangerous working conditions, and lacking any opportunity formoral or
intellectual growth. In explaining why it backed Progressive reforms, theNational
Conference ofCharities declared that "all we have attempted is to keep the sub-basement
floorwhich we regard as positively the lowest stratum that should be tolerated by a
community interested in
self-preservation" (1912). While reformers certainly cared
deeply about the underprivileged, they also feared the future effects of long hours, low
wages, and stunted growth. The preamble to the Oregon MinimumWage Law explicitly
declared that "the welfare of the State ofOregon requires thatwomen and minors should
be protected from conditions of laborwhich have a pernicious effect on their health and
morals, and inadequate wages . . . have such a pernicious
effect" (Kessler-Harris).
Urofsky indicates that, the common law had developed various doctrines on the
relation ofmaster and servantwhich,while sensible and appropriate in a pre-industrial
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society, reformers now claimed placed intolerable burdens on workingmen (Crispin v.
Babbitt, 1880). Especially troublesome were three defenses which apparently immunized
employers from any liability for job-related injuries to their employees:
1 . The fellow-servant doctrine for which each worker stood responsible for the
negligence ofother employees resulting in his injury, on the theory that he
should acquaint himselfwith the bad habits ofhis co-workers, and even
encourage them to more prudent behavior, perhaps this had made sense in
small workshops, but it seemed far divorced from the realities of largemills or
factories, where hundreds or even thousands ofmen labored on different
shifts.
2. Contributory negligence served to shift liability ifany fault could be found in
the conduct of the worker. InArizona, for example, a railroad engineer had
been forced to work thirty hours straight, in violation ofa state law, and as a
result had fallen asleep on the job, thus causing an accident inwhich he had
been injured. The engineer had continued work only because of the threat of
dismissal, but the court held him contributorily negligent. He had a free
choice, the judges said, ofcooperating or terminating his employment, and by
choosing to cooperate became responsible for the results.
3. Assumption of risk. Dangerous or even illegal conditions did not vitiate the
defense. Ifaworker knew of these dangers and still accepted employment, the
law held he had assumed any attendant risks. Volenti no fit injuria ran the
ancientmaxim, that to which a person assents is not an injury. Chief Justice
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Lemuel Shaw ofMassachusetts, in a case cited frequently both in England and
America, explained, "he who engaged in the employment ofanother for the
performance of specified duties and service for compensation, takes upon
himself the natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the performance of
such services, and in legal presumption, the compensation is adjusted
accordingly."(Farwell v. Boston) (Weinstein)
Short ofgross negligence, employers had practically no responsibility for what happened
to their employees.
Urofsky further writes that:
Reformers thus sought to shift liability from employees to employers, and
to change the basis for compensation from causal negligence to strict
liability. Because the worker in amodem industrial factory ormine had
little or no control over the environment or the actions of fellow
employees, the risk should be placed on the employer, who could more
easily absorb the costs either through insurance or passing them on to
consumers in the form ofmarginally higher prices. Some enlightened
businessmen, especially those in theNational Civic Federation, recognized
the force of this argument, and also supported it as ameans of
rationalizing business costs. Itwould be far cheaper to set up an objective
and predictable insurance scheme than to pay litigation fees for hundreds
ofpersonal injury suits. Other reformers spoke in terms of social costs. If
breadwinners were injured or disabled, they and their familieswould be
thrown upon the public expense. The argument ran that since business
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profited by ignoring worker safety, industry - not the public - should bear
the costs. (Urofsky)
This shift from fault-based liability to strict liability represented a huge shift for the
United States and upset many conservatives (Wesser).
The Supreme Court history further indicates that shifting liability constituted but
one prong of the Progressive program; the other would provide an orderly and rational
scheme to compensate employees for injuries and death resulting from job-related
accidents. Private employer liability insurance had been introduced in the United States in
the 1880's, and premiums rose from about $200,000 in 1887 to more than $35,000,000 by
1912 (Lubove). No one objected to private workmen's compensation programs, and
many businesses voluntarily adopted plans in order to rationalize their expenses. Both
International Harvester and United States Steel Corporation established compensation
programs in 1910. A year later the National Civil Federation proposed amodel bill; even
the National Association ofManufacturers, which rarely agreed with the reformers,
endorsed the principle ofworkmen's compensation at its 191 1 convention (Wesser).
Progressives called upon the states and the federal government to establish government-
operated workmen's compensation insurance pools and then require all employers to
either subscribe to the public plan or secure comparable private coverage. In return,
employers would be immune from liability for those accidents covered under the plan,
although theywould still, as under common law, be subject to suit in cases ofgross
negligence on their part. By the end of 1910, six states had enacted some form of
compulsory workmen's compensation (Freund).
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In 1917, several cases involving workmen's compensation reached the Supreme
Court; onMarch 6, three opinions came down upholding the three prevailing types of
compensation laws. In a 5-4 decision, the Court sustained aWashington state plan
requiring employer participation in an exclusive state fund. It then unanimously upheld
the Iowa elective statute, holding that, "the FourteenthAmendment, does not prevent a
state from establishing workmen's compensationwithout the consent of the employer,
incidentally abolishing his defenses" (Harris v. Bleakley, 1917).
2.15 Politics - Welfare State?
The title ofFishback and Kantor's book, A Prelude to theWelfare State: The
Origins ofWorkers' Compensation, portends the nature of the political stakes involved
with the institution ofworkers' compensation in the United States. The title also reflects
the typical political sides of the debate, conservative versus progressive. In several
instances, the authors refer to persons such as Theodore Roosevelt as the "socialist"
President, without being pejorative, but in a matter-of-fact manner. Some areas of
conflict were the economics ofworkman's compensation in comparison to the cost of
lawsuits under employers'liability, benefit levels, state versus private insurance,
administration of the law, coverage of specific industries, and the right ofworkers to
continue to sue based on employer negligence (MEA 1912).
The players in the debate were made up ofbroad interest groups organized
labor, employers, insurers, and attorneys - all sharing different views regarding the means
ofachieving better workplace accident compensation. Disagreements within unions were
largely around the bestway to achieve the ideal program. Should they accept a basic law
ofworkmen's compensation without state insurance and therefore low benefits just to get
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the law on the books, then go formore at a later date? Or should they go for the entire
package immediately? On a state-by-state basis, incorporation ofworkmen's
compensation laws was applied at different times and to varying degrees. Some were
very resistant to involving insurance companies, but amajor question was how the cost of
workmen's compensation would be shared by employers and workers. Then the issue
became what percentage ofwages should be replaced or the maximum weekly amount
benefit to be permitted. The next issue was whether workers would have the option of
either collecting the guaranteedworkman's compensation benefit or suing their employer
under negligence liability. Employers were resistant to the option for injured workers
because it would subject them to the same legal and financial uncertainty that they were
trying to eliminate. Themost contentious issue was the choice between state and private
insurance ofworkmen's compensation. Different states accepted different sides of this
legislation by joining a state fund or purchasing private insurance (Fishback, Kantor).
Employers, workers, and insurers all supported the general concept ofworkmen's
compensation, but debated the specifics. The dispute over state insurance versus private
insurance was intense (see Appendix B describing the type of insurance for each state).
Union leaders pushed for state insurance because theywere uncomfortablewith private
insurance profiting by denying benefits to deserving injured workers. Insurers fought to
save their business and charged that state-funded insurance was a sign of creeping
socialism. Most states allowed employers to contractwith private insurers to underwrite
the accident risk. Seven states establishedmonopoly state funds; ten others created state
funds that competed with private insurers. The strength ofworkers' compensationwas
that itwas broadly accepted by all factions because it helped resolve legal and
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information problems associatedwith insuring individual
workers'
accident risk. It was
not until the 1970s that benefit rates rose to acceptable levels (Fishback, Kantor).
Fishback and Kantor argue that by the time
workers'
compensation was accepted,
the conscience of the nation was impacted such that progressive politics won out over
conservative politics. Therefore, workmen's compensation was seen as a prelude to the
welfare state, setting the stage for the dramatic expansion of the government's role during
theNew Deal and Great Society (2000).
2.16 Incentives
Between 1935 and 1978, changes inworkers'compensation systems were
niinimal. Some states created "second injury funds" to encourage employers to hire
workers with disabilities. In 1978, the fixed benefit system of the workers' compensation
plan was changed (Harger). There were some lump sum payouts ifpersons were able to
return to work after an injury. In 1979, the name was changed fromworkmen's
compensation to workers' compensation reflecting the application of
workers'
compensation to all injury claims (Harger). The Bureau of
Workers' Compensation
under theDepartment ofCommerce was replaced and expanded by the Division of
Workers' Compensation under the newDepartment ofLabor and Employment Security
(Harger). Premiums for employers were reduced by 23 percent for employers from 1978
through 1982. Therewas another benefit restructuring in 1990 (Harger). Litigation and
medical care continued to be problems at the end of the twentieth century. Return to
Work programs got injured employees back to work quickly, thereby reducing costs;
costs reductionwas furthered by the Americans with Disabilities Act which required that
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adaptations be made for injured or disabled workers, within reason. In 2003, another new
benefit structure was enacted in several states (Harger).
The safety incentives that workers'compensation creates are complicated. On the
one hand, insurance provides employers with a clear reason to reduce safety hazards; their
premiums should decrease when they implement safer work practices. On the other hand.
it may discourage workers from working safely, since they are guaranteed at least some
replacement of their wages if they are injured on the job. As a result, the early years after
workers'
compensation was implemented were spent working out kinks in the system that
had led, for example, to increased injury rates in the mining industry. (A guarantee of
income meant that miners, paid by the ton rather than by the hour, had less incentive to
spend time on safety precautions.) Most industries, however, experienced injury declines
(Fishback, Kantor).
Nearly a century later, several studies by economist Richard Butler and colleagues
indicate that asworkers'compensation benefits rise, workers are likely both to takemore
risks while working and to report claims on injuries that theymight have let go at a lower
benefit rate. To combat some of these effects, state legislatures have tweaked their
workers'
compensation statutes in recent years. States have introduced changes like
increased deductibles for employers, increasedwaiting times before benefits begin,
increased penalties for fraud, and greater incentives to return employees to work as
quickly as possible after an injury. But in the end, the incentives that
workers'
compensation insurance creates today are notmuch different than theywere nearly 100
years ago (Conaway).
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What has become more complicated in recent years, however, is how those
incentives interact with events outside the insurance system and how those interactions
affect workplace safety. In the 1980s, for instance, a spike in reported injury rates led to
increased insurance costs, which led to more employers being covered by the state insurer
of last resort both ofwhich ultimately resulted in the only sustained increase in
workplace injuries since OSHA began keeping records. Market forces caused these
changes, not
workers'
compensation but the economic structure ofworkers'
compensation compounded their effects (Conaway).
Actually,workers'compensation has experienced some success as evidenced by
appendices A and B. Appendix A shows the long-term trends inworkers'compensation
coverage and costs from 1940 through 1995. In 1940, 73.6 percent of salaries were
covered; this figure rose to 91 percent in 1995. The amount of compensation compared
to the employees'salaries was initially a major debate (Fishback).
Appendix C reflects shares ofworkers'compensation payments made by types of
insurer (private, government or self-insurance). Interestingly, self-insured payments rose
from 18.8 percent in 1940 to 21.9 percent in 1998, but went as high as 25.9 percent in
1994 and 1995 (Fishback).
Appendix D provides the characteristics ofworkers'compensation laws in the
United States. This document covers the types ofcarrier between 1910 and 1930.
Importantly, policies written with deductibles, such as $1 million per occurrence, are
affectively self insured as the likelihood of the loss amount impacting the insurance
company is remote (Fishback).
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In the mid-to-late 1980s, the United States experienced its only sustained increase
in workplace injuries since OSHA started keeping records in 1973 (Fishback). The injury
rate increased from 7.6 injuries per 100 workers in 1983 to 8.9 per 100 in 1992, while the
number ofworkers reporting injuries increased from 4.8 million to 6.8 million. Conaway,
in her Regional Review article (2003), suggests much of the increase derived from
increased attention to a newly identified workplace injury ergonomic, musculoskeletal
or cumulative trauma disorders, often referred to as soft tissue injuries (illnesses).
Previously, most workers viewed the ganglions, tendonitis, and carpal tunnel
syndrome they acquired after years ofwork on factory lines or in offices as a natural part
ofhaving a job (Conaway). These problems were rarely reported to OSHA and therefore
comprised only a small portion of reported injuries and illnesses. But in the 1980s,
OSHA started levying citations and fines against major manufacturers like Hanes
Knitware and Samsonite for ergonomic hazards in theirworkplaces; consequently,
workers and employers alike started taking ergonomic injuries more seriously (Conaway).
Nearly 750,000 people reported a musculoskeletal disorder due to theirwork environment
in 1992 (Conaway).
A second important factorwas the rise ofhealth care costs in general. In the
traditional health insurance market, rising costs precipitated a shift toward managed care
programs that tried to curb costs by restricting access to specialists and expensive
treatments. Butworkers'compensation insurers could not quickly adopt the same
techniques because major changes inworkers'compensation benefits and premiums
required state legislative action. And sinceworkers'compensation allowed for more
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flexibility and choice in treatment, more illnesses and injuries were treated under
workers'
compensation than might have been (Conaway).
There was also another, more subtle and complicated cause for the increase.
Workers'
compensation insurers now faced unexpectedly high claims because of the
increase in ergonomic injuries and cost-shifting into the
workers'
compensation system.
In the short run, however, regulatory constraints prohibited insurers from either increasing
premiums or cutting back on the types of injuries that were covered. (Prices eventually
did rise - indeed, employers were paying nearly double the premiums in 1994 that they
were in 1986 - but costs were still increasing faster than premiums.) As a result,
"insurers began to refuse to cover any companies that they expected to generate
significant claims. As a result, the residual risk pool the group of employers denied
traditionalworkers'compensation coverage and covered instead by the state-established
insurer of last resort grew enormously"(Conaway).
2.17 The MoralHazard Problem and Accident Compensation
Compensation for accidents has the potential to generate problems withmoral
hazard. Specifically, people exercise less cautionwhile working because their net losses
from injury are reduced by the availability ofcompensation. Over the course of the
century, there have been two trends that have contributed to the potential for increased
moral hazard problems. First, the character of the most common injuries has changed. In
the early 1900s the common workplace injuries were readily identifiable; most common
was the probability ofaccidents leading to broken bones, lost body parts, and fatalities.
Today, themost common forms ofworkers'compensation injuries are soft tissue injuries
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to the back and carpal tunnel syndrome in wrists. These injuries are more difficult to
diagnose effectively, which may lead to excess reporting of these types of injuries
(Fishback).
The second trend has been a rise in benefit levels as a share ofafter-tax income.
Workers'
compensation payments are not taxed. When the workers' compensation
programs were first introduced, the federal income tax was first being put into place.
Through 1940, less than 7 percent ofhouseholds were subject to the income tax. Since
World War II, however, the number ofhouseholds subject to income tax has risen
substantially higher. As a result,
workers'
compensation benefits have been replacing a
higher share of the after-tax wage. The absence ofmuch taxation in the early 1900s
meant thatworkers' compensation benefits often replaced less than two-thirds of the
after-tax wage, and sometimes caps on weekly benefits led to replacement ofa
substantially lower percentage. Today, with greater taxation ofwages,
workers'
compensation benefits are replacing up to 90 percent of the after-tax wage in some states
(Fishback).
Both the trend towardmore soft-tissue injuries and the higher after-tax
replacement rates have led to improvements in the compensation of injured workers,
although there is evidence thatworkers pay for these improvements through lowerwages
(Moore and Viscusi 1990). On the other hand, these trends also increase the risk of
problems with moral hazard, which in turn leads to higher costs for employers and
insurers. Employers and insurers have sought to limit the problems withmoral hazard
through closermonitoring ofaccident claims and the recovery process. The tensions
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between improved accident compensation and moral hazard have been a constant source
ofconflict in the debates over the proper level ofcompensation for workers (Fishback).
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3.0 Methodology
The first portion of this work is documentation of the origins ofworkers'
compensation and the political and legal timbre of the country during its origins. The
following portion of the thesis is through research ofwrittenmaterials.
Little has beenwritten regarding the differences between traditional safety
professional positions and that of the insurance company risk control specialist. Yet one
must be acutely aware on an individual basis, that the differences are often quite
significant. For example, due to the one-yearwindow oftypical policy periods, the risk
control specialist frequentlymay have to seek immediate and drastic change to make a
risk profitable for the insurance companywhile keeping inmind service to the client
company. On other occasions, the risk control specialist mustmake the client company
look sufficiently high-risk to justify canceling coverage due to immediate loss potential.
It is a fine line thatmany choose not to address for fear ofbeing on the record.
The methodology for exainining the origins of insurance consisted of traditional
library, bookstore, and online research. The methodology for capturing modem risk
control consultation was through interviews with five people representing different
perspectives of the risk control department.
A questionnaire was developed for consistency during face-to-face, or telephonic
interviews, with five experienced persons in the insurance industry. The interviews have
been transcribed and used predominately to address downsizing impact, fiduciary
conflicts for risk control, and philosophical changes of interpretations in recent history.
Aside fromjob title and years ofexperience, other questions were as follows:
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? Please discuss the hierarchy of risk control and the support provided for those
positions within your existing company. Has your company been downsized in
the past 10 years?
? How has downsizing affected your job in risk control?
? Would you estimate the experience level in your department to be
balanced (inexperienced to very experienced)?
? Has your department's training budget been impacted? More or less?
? Are you using outsourcers or risk control vendors?
? Is quality affected when using outsourcers? How?
? How has outsourcing changed your job?
? Are you on a billable hours system?
? Does the billable hours system have potential ethical concerns?
? Howmany billable hours per week are required?
? Do billable hours impact the level of service? Why?
? What are your feelings about this statement, "give them as much safety as
they can afford"?
? As regards quality, "we don'tmake Cadillacs, we make Chevy's"? What
is its relevance?
? Do you do underwriting surveys?
? What is the difference between underwriting driven versus consultative
service?
? What percentage ofyour tasks are bundled versus unbundled?
Eure 58
? What is the focus ofbundled work?
? Is it different for unbundled work? How?
? Have you felt a client needed further assistance with safety issues but
underwriting indicate there is no money? Is there amoral conflict? How
do you rationalize your activity or inactivity?
? What is the impact ofworkers comp deductibles on your services to
clients?
? Policies are typically for a year's duration. How does this one-year
window affect the urgency with which you prioritize recommendations?
Would that differ ifyou were EHS for private industry? How?
? Risk control has become a profit center in recent years. How has that
impacted the way you function or the culture within risk control?
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4.0 Results
It was surprising how little has been written regarding the origins of risk control
within insurance companies, aside from the traditional phrase, "risk control being the
eyes and ears of
underwriting."Over the years, as
workers'
compensation policies have
morphed, the responsibilities of risk control consultants and their fiduciary
responsibilities have also had to change. To document the change, interviews were
conducted with five persons with significant experience in the field. The interviewees'
conclusions are encapsulated in Pat Allen's 2003 speech. Ms. Allen is a 'headhunter' or
job placement recruiter who is well known in the industry. Headhunters work for
employment search firms, many ofwhich have made a living placing employees for
employers. PatAllen is a major and nationally known recruiter who spoke at the ISO
(International Standards Organization) conference ofNovember 2003. In her speech, Ms.
Allen presents several informative and interesting facts about insurance risk control
positions, "...the insurance loss control pool, which once had 18,000 viable candidates
was reduced overnight by almost 50 percent". Her speech places some blame on the
upsurge ofcomputer technology and the ease in finding alternative careers, daily rounds
of re-engineering (also known as downsizing), and globalization. Interestingly,Ms. Allen
makes the point that re-engineering "shook the loyalty ofemployees everywhere and at all
levels." She also cites statistic that one safetymanagement position was put in jeopardy
for every five hundred manufacturing jobs lost to globalization (foreign soil) (Allen).
Ms. Allen goes on to identify outsourcing and unbundling of insurance services as
thriving, "spurred on by the ever-present desire to increase income and reduce expenses."
These issues become dominant in 1999, but the terrorist attack ofSeptember 1 1, 2001,
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added a new emphasis for the discipline ofdisaster recovery and planning which risk
control has emphasized. Another issue that has helped is the reduced value of 401-K's
during the stockmarket downsizing which postponed retirements.
In the current environment, previously secure companies such as Kemper,
Reliance, Royal, and Alliance have disbanded, leaving a flood of risk control talent on the
streets. Ms. Allen specifies seven specific forces that contribute to the situation:
1 . Consolidation and the elimination of the major companies. There are now only 8-
10 major companies.
2. Lack of systematic multi-line training programs resulting in the median age of the
loss control professional advancing by five years. The gap between seasoned
professionals and younger candidates has widened.
3. Rapid rise in the use ofoutsource risk control and independent contractors. As
Allen puts it "...fromW2's to 1099's overnight."
4. Larger fee companies have grown significantly. The transition has been
impossible for many. Using fee companies causes a loss ofpersonal interest and
consequently quality.
5. Property emphasis has reduced the demand for casualty-oriented expertise.
6. Only a handful ofcompanies write the largemulti-national and global accounts.
Middlemarket business competition is so intense thatmany will fail soon.
7. The third-partyadministratorswith unbundled services are growing.
(2003).
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This excellent presentation also includes a study of risk control professionals, for which
1200 requests were distributed with 319 respondents. Interestingly, the issue causing the
most difficulty was "uncertainty" at 45 percent. (Allen)
4.1 Interviews
Personal interviews were critical to collecting information, particularly regarding
the current status of risk control, the impact ofdownsizing and changes initiated by risk
control becoming a profit center. The interviews were made necessary because research
revealed that writings on this subject are sparse. The subject of this thesis required that
interviewees were of sufficient age and experience that their work history in the risk
control field would span the 1980s and extend through 2005. These decades encapsulated
the periods of risk control's transition from bundled through unbundled, the impact of
TQM, and current risk control in the world ofdeductibleworkers'compensation policies
and third-party adrninistration.
Some companies, actually have sales departments within risk control, devoted
entirely to sales ofrisk control consultative services. This is quite a transition for a field
that has traditionally been seen as an engineering discipline. (Of the interviewees, Randy
Moon is now theNational Sales, Assistant Vice President for his company.)
4.2 Interviewees
Andrew Faga is a Senior AccountManager with over twenty-fiveyears'
experience in the risk control field with several different insurance companies. Andrew
works for a division ofhis company, which is a third-party administrator for claims and
risk control services and recently has been officially allotted 25 percent ofhis time for
sales activities ofrisk control services.
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Joseph Farren is a Practice Leader that came to the third-party administration
company from a Fortune 500 client. Joe's input was important because his experience
allows him to view safety issues from both the insurance angle and as a broker's risk
control specialist that was imbedded with the client. Joe also had to transition to a
"billable hours" version of risk control performance standards.
Nick Montagna has more than fifteenyears'experience with the same insurance
company, with exception of a buyout, after which he remained with the new entity.
Nick's input was important as he has transitioned from the traditional risk control
position into the role ofmanaging vendors that are used by the third-party administrator
or risk control department.
Patricia Negro has been in the field over twenty years and has gone through a
downsizing. Pat had to transition from a mid-market type company using traditional
accounting for her time, to a largely unbundled approach to insurance and billable hours.
Bill Street is the head ofa large film and aluminum company; he has the
perspective ofusing risk control services for over 10 years. He also worked as a field
auditor. Bill has his own internal safety department staff and uses the services of a third-
party administrator for risk control services. His input was important in discussing
differences in service and quality as risk control has transitioned in recent years.
Time constraints, on RandyMoon's part, did not allow for a full interview.
However, Randy's change in title is in itself reflective ofa significant change in how risk
control is viewed. Randy is now the Assistant Vice President in charge ofNational Sales
ofRisk Control Services. This is a new position that was created in 2005. Randy has
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been with one insurance company for approximately thirty years and has seen its risk
control department transition from a purely customer service, bundled environment to a
full profit center, a change which has significantly altered the role of risk control. Now
Randy is in a sales position with sales revenue goals and a sales staff.
4.3 Changes in the Hierarchy ofRisk Control
This progression of risk control title changes over the years was acknowledged by
all of the consultants interviewed. The progression was from an inspector - "the eyes and
ears of
underwriting"(Negro) or "Hector the Inspector" (Farren), an "enforcer" (Faga), to
account manager and outsource manager identified by everyone interviewed. Everyone
also learned all lines ofcoverage (workers' compensation, fire, property, security,
liability, professional liability, fleet, etc) from training programs within their own
companies, but indicate that there is no existing infrastructure for such training now.
All interviewed underwent downsizing, some on more than one occasion. Some
downsizing appears to be extreme, in one case, staffing was reduced from approximately
850 in 1990, to 450 in 1996, to about 75 now. In response to questions regarding the
impact ofdownsizing on their career, everyone indicated that the impact has been
significant. In the words ofFarren, "we becamemore account coordinators becausewe
weren't actually out dong the servicing, we were actually providing overall oversight.
We were the intermediary, providing professional
vendors."Nick indicates expertise was
lost andmany left the industry. Nick nowmanages the "strategic alliance
network,"
(outside vendors), a position newly created within the past five years. With the increased
use ofvendors and older experienced consultant employees, there is no one in the
pipeline to continue the discipline. Faga has adapted to the use ofaffiliates (vendors) and
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currentlymanages some large companies for which most services - with the exception of
his management duties - are provided almost totally by affiliates.
Pat Negro indicates her job has expanded. Currently, she does risk control
surveys and audits in the field (at client sites), safety inspections for underwriting,
management ofclient accounts, and management and quality reviews for vendors. Since
she works from the home, she is also responsible for a much higher percentage of the
typical administrative/secretarial work than when she worked from an office. She also
suggests that now, the
'noisiest'
accounts get the attention. Time and underwriting
budgets do not permit the same attention to be given to smaller accounts or accounts that
do not complain. Most respondents attribute these observations to a downsized staff that
is now too small to effectively service all clients.
All of the interviewees concurred that travel time to service clients has increased,
and corresponding expenses and inefficiencies have increased in some proportion to the
percentage ofdownsizing. The quantity ofwork decreased as underwritten (bundled)
work, which typically required a risk control visit to each account, diminished and "sold
service work,"meaning hours billed directly to a client, increased. Bill Street, who
actually purchases risk control services, indicates he sees more specialization and
expertise from the risk control department. This may be expected since he would rarely
have an inexperienced person servicing his account now, as the entire staff is highly
experienced. Everyone indicated that the entire staff is older and experienced, with no
younger employees or intern positions available. The impact is that all salaries are high
and the staff is unbalanced. In an environment of the risk control profit center, a balanced
staffbecomes important as indicated by the following composite summary of the
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interviewees'
comments: The downsizing, with the resulting end to internship and
training programs, has caused an imbalance in typical safety staffs. Normally, a group of
seasoned professionals, would be a good thing. However, in an environment where risk
control is a profit center, a balanced staffbecomes important. Where a staff is
unbalanced, a higher paid consultant may spend time on clients or issues that do not
require his level of expertise. As a profit center and sales organization, a balanced staff in
terms of age, experience, and pay scale is important for
profitability."
In general, all respondents suggest that training budgets have been drastically
reduced or eliminated. In response to questions regarding training, internships, or
balanced staffs, a frequent comment was, "in general, we do not hire people that need a
lot of training." In the 'billable hours' world, the time needed for appropriate training
represents a loss ofrevenue. Negro makes a particularly cogent remark in this regard, "in
this environment, training is seen as an expense rather than an investment. We hire
experienced only. The role of the insurance industry as a safety training ground has
effectively
ended." Nick indicates that "companies just don't have the time nor can they
incur the cost to train now."
Everyone indicated that quality is impacted by the use ofvendor services. Faga
feels much more time must be spent on qualitywhen using vendors to service accounts,
but not necessarily because they are inherently unqualified. He feels that since he does
not know them or theirwork personally, he must review their work more thoroughly and
providemore detailed instructions. He reads the vendor reports before they are
distributed; he reviews the work of internal consultants after they are distributed. Farren
believes significantlymore quality control is necessarywhen vendors are used. Nick
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suggests that "vendors do not seem to have as many systems management type
people."
This is important because progressive understanding ofEHS is that management systems
must be addressed for effective, long-term control of
workers'
compensation or other
losses.
4.4 Risk Control as a Profit Center
Montagna associated layoffs and downsizing with becoming a profit center. In his
response to questions regarding this issue, Montagna stated:
All ofa sudden, cost benefit analysis is applicable to the actual risk control
department. The number ofconsultants for the first time had to be
carefully synchronized with the amount ofpremium written minus the
deductibles. Each person had to show their viability based on profits and
their workloads. Before, we were a profit center, even though we kept
track ofour hours, itwasn't an issue, howmany hours youworked. It was
more, well, when I first started, howmany units you did in a certain period
of time. But at some point it became a source ofrevenue. . .the risk control
department. Once we started offering our services independent of the
insurance product it became, now ifyou're going to sell your service to
somebody, then you should have a goal for howmuch of that service
you're going to sell over a period of time.
On the same topic, Faga responded:
And, ofcourse, where it's going to be a stretch goal, so you've go to do
something to sell more this year, than you sold last year, andmore next
year, than you sold this year. And it 's always got to bemore and more
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and more. And so, we've got to keep score and we've to get out there and
push to sell service. And so that put more pressure on us. We had people
who were counting the money on a regular basis and wanting to know why
we haven'tmet whatever our goals are. So we got more into that realm of
being held accountable for a number or a dollar figure in a certain period
of time.
All respondents felt that the imperative to fix safety problems has now been
shifted to the client, with less responsibility for underwriting or risk control. Faga
presented a particularly unique side of this question when he stated:
We can tell them something is wrong but not provide service beyond
allocated resources from underwriting. Ifadditional services are
necessary, the client company can purchase them with a separate contract.
The question becomes, if the danger is imminent, and the client says they
cannot afford to make the problem safe, should I go to OSHA or some
other regulating entity. I have never done so in the past, or been faced
with that choice, butwould like to think I would ifnecessary.
This dilemma is one thatwas less obvious when services were unbundled and the budget
to provide important safety services was usually given the okay by underwriting. That is,
within the parameters ofthe 4 to 5 percent premium standard for customer service
(Farren, Faga, Montagna).
Faga felt that his contacts in private industry had as much timely urgency as risk
control. Others interviewed did not consider this to be the case. Farren expressed the
pressure for risk control to show or demonstrate a deliverable within nine months of the
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policy inception and three months prior to expiration. This sometimes influenced the
issues that selected for attention. At times, the more visible issues were chosen over the
more substantive^ but less visible issues (Farren).
Another factor since risk control has become a profit center, has been how
workers'
compensation policies are written. In this regard, the interviewees were asked
to comment on the impact of insurance policies that are written with deductibles. Farren
stated that:
Bad - well they increased the deductibles to where they put the onus on
businesses, themselves. Some companies may increase deductibles and
putmore onus on the business owner. Ifyou had a $250,000 deductible as
a business owner. . . the insurance company is not providing as much risk
control as you once received in the past, you feel a need to protect your
own operation from that financial setback that could cost you - 1 mean can
you afford to spend $250,000 on a loss? And you need to provide that
protection to your business - you could go out and hire your own risk
control/risk management company to provide those services and direct
them specifically in the areas you think - a consultant will direct you and
help you do an evaluation and tell you what they think the concentration
should be, then in addition to just spending the dollar, you can direct it to
certain areas as well, where you think youmay have problems. Where in
the past, ifan insurance company was providing risk control services at
their cost, theymay direct them to certain areas. Where that helps put
control back on the owner (the deductible).
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Montagna agreed with Farren, stating that, "with their budget, they can direct it in
certain areas they want it as well." Montagna went on to say that:
A part of it has to do withmarket - 1 tliink back two decades ago, you had
more traditional insurance products and insurance relationships, and
underwriters were underwriters and they put company assets at risk and
they appointed a loss control staff to help get definite information to make
sure they were pricing and grading risks accurately and then to preserve
their assets at the end of the day, thereby reducing claims. Now with the
deductibles with these different insurance arrangements that are really
financial products, you get away from true underwriting. They are
financial - the people from Prudential office sell financial products,where
we don't have a lot ofwork, if it's not to the
underwriters'
advantage - to
help reduce claims could be the largest one. But they don't see any
advantage in the risk control staff, contracted to that extentwith no payout
to them directly. Therefore, I think theymaintain a much leaner staff- 1
think a more highly qualified, more mature - consulting people offer that
to the clients and the clients can buy those services or not, but it's up to the
client. For that to be the gradual change in the insurance world over the
years - even a lot of the companies that I've worked have simply gone out
of the traditional insurance market and they are not conveying that
thoroughly.
PatNegro took a similar view, but added an interesting insight, stating that ,
"there'smore ofa global impact, which I think changes viewpoints about client/carrier
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relationships. It's the way of the consultant now. You get the service ifyou pay for it. . .
it's not an altruistic thing, we're not just here to make the world a safer
place."Negro's
issue ofaltruism as part of the risk control ethic encapsulates a significant change that
appears to have occurred over the years. Most interviewees indicated that general safety
was a dynamic ofrisk control prior to the late 1980s, butwas lostwith the advent of
unbundled services and the billable hour requirement,. All felt varying degrees of
cognitive dissonancewhen required to inadequately address visible safety concerns
strictly because ofa lack ofbillable hours available. This was particularly true when
customer service is negatively impacted because there is no place to account for billable
hours.
4.5 Billable Hours
One ofthe most pronounced changes in the performance measurements ofrisk
control specialists for a profit center is billable hours. Bundled work is for underwriting
and costs generally are paid forwithin the premium charge and therefore transparent to
the client. The workmay be directed by the underwriter or provided to the client as a
value-added service. Fiduciary responsibility rests primarilywith the underwriter and
time and expenses for customer service are incurred at the underwriter's direction.
Unbundled work is work that the client has requested and is not a part of the
premium. In fact, unbundled work need not be associatedwith a policy at all andmay be
part of the program as a third-party administrator. The client will be billed for unbundled
services at an agreed flat fee or by the hour. In this mode, the consultant's primary
fiduciary responsibility is to the client. An underwritermay even be barred from
receiving copies of the client's report in this mode.
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All of the consultants are partially or totally on a billable hours system, or in some
way, have revenue-producing responsibilities. Faga is responsible for 75 percent billable
hours revenue, with 25 percent ofhis time allotted for involvement with sales activities.
He works for RandyMoon, theNational Sales Assistant Vice President, who is dedicated
to developing new revenue for the consulting group. "You can provide only the service
they can afford or asked you to do. Billable hours and deductibles . . .years ago the
insurance industrymay have been the champion. . (Farren). Farren also observed that,
"I don't tliink we have lost anything. I think it has evolved. There are different ways to
transfer risk today (retentions, deductibles, etc). We are not in the vanguard anymore, but
we still contribute. Billable hours make people more accountable (Street, Farren), but
they (billable hours) also bum people out".
Fagawent further, saying:
If I'm a consultant to a client and they have an issue of an imminent
danger and I point it out to them, then it's theirmoral responsibility to do
something about it. I mean, my obligation is to identify the issue and give
them a reasonable solution or suggest a reasonable solution. If they. Let
me put it this way, inmost cases they are going recognize that and it's
theirwork force thatwe're talking about. So the moral imperative is really
theirs to do something about it. Now, ifa clientwere to completely turn a
blind eye to that and say well, that's okay, I don't care that somebody is
going to get hurt, there I can't afford to do it. Or I chose not to do it. Then
I guess, ultimately Iwould be faced with, do I go to, for instance OSHA
and say, this is an imminent danger and these people are not addressing
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that. I've never really been faced with that choice. Depending on the
magnitude of it, if it was an imminent danger ofdeath or of serious harm, I
would like to tliink that I would go that extra step and bring it to the
authorities and say, look this is a problem that needs to be addressed. But
I haven't been facedwith that.
When asked how the changes in the way risk control is driven has impacted the
interviewees'
perception ofmodem risk control, Farren responds interestingly:
I'm proud ofwhat I do, I'm proud of telling my son what I do, because I
still look at it like, ifmaybe nothing more than putting a freaking guard on
a machine or something. But I've done something that has helped save
somebody from being injured or hurt. And when I look into what these
bigger accounts, and you put in these bigger programs, etc., and you're
impacting thousands ofpeople's lives by having these programs put in
place and etc. I feel good about that and I tliink sometimes we've gotten
away from that. We're looking strictly at dollars and cents and that's how
we're instructed. It's how you can sell it. . .you can sell it. . .you can sell it.
Thenmaybe you can, andmaybe you do have to have the dollars and cents
figures there, but I never lost the vision or the sight that basically, the main
reason I'm here is to help people.
Along that line, Montagna stated:
I believe that, under historical terms, not spendingwhat was typically
spent for risk control within the local business, is starting with letting you
know thatmoney is allocated toward the - companies that allocate -
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insurance companies that lessen the dollar amount allocated towards risk
control over the years, over past historical percentage continued reduction
in that does affect the overall - one would think that it would affect the
overall quality within that book ofbusiness. Does it affect the overall
quality delivered? By risk control, by the locations that they're looking at,
I don't think that on an individual basis those locations get less ofa quality
evaluation unless, they're only asked to provide facts on a bare minimum.
I want the level of service they used to receive in the past, but give it to me
for 25 percent less costs, ifnot more than 25 percent less costs and, you
break even - or who is going to suffer - is it the companywho's providing
the service - are they going to do it for less costs, or are they going to look
to where they can streamline the operation and provide less, maybe more
visual and less report or you knowjust things like that. But the
underwriter is going to say, I still want that same report - 1 still want all
this - theywant the same quality, they just don't want to spend what they
used to spend for it.
The interviewees were asked for their explanation of two often heard phrases
relating to billable hours and customer service, "give them as much safety as they can
afford"
and "we don'tmake Cadillacs, we make Chevy's". Andy, who is part of the sales
force responded that the first statementmeans "sell them everything that we have to sell
them, whether they need it or not", a philosophy that Andy does not subscribe
to."
Regarding the second phrase, which actually deals with quality, Nick and Faga agreed
that:
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This refers to the level ofquality thatmay be inconsistent. One person
could go in and bill the client, do a very good job and bill the client for 20
hours. And have a reasonable reportwith some pictures and some good
technical information in it. And another person may be more, very
technically oriented and very detail oriented and may do the same type of
work but to amuch higher technical degree. Much more numerical or
computer analysis. A lotmore pictures. A lotmore verbiage in their
report and they could come back with a 35 hour or a 40 hour, or a 50 hour
report. This creates a problem if the expectation of the client who is
getting the bill has not been appropriately set. If they think they're going
to pay 20 hours for something and they get a bill for 60 hours, now you got
a problem. And so, it's amatter ofmaking sure your field staff
understands the expectation of the client and the expectation ofour
company in terms ofwhat the end product should be. Everybody needs to
understand that and work accordingly, so that a client who has a
reasonable expectation of a 20-hour bill is going to get that 20 to 25 hour
bill versus the 50-hour bill. (Faga).
Any time money is collected or used as a measure for services, the question of
ethical accounting arises. The interviewees were asked, "does the billable hours system
have potential ethical concerns?" Everyone was given the option of interpreting the term
"ethical"
as they wished. Nick felt the system does create the potential for ethical
concerns, "you should not bill a client formore thanwhat you've
provided." Faga
agreed, saying that :
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Because your money is generated by the amount ofhours that you put into
a particular job and, you know, if it takes you eight hours to do a job and at
the end of the month you need 10 hours to meet your goal, that eight hours
may grow into ten hours. Consequently, our time per survey over the
years has grown to somewhere in the 16 to 1 8 hours. . .and I can remember
years ago, when I could do a pretty good piece ofwork in about six to
seven hours.
Farren'
s response to this questionwas, "I do not like the billable hours concept as
relates to quality. Everybody today is profit-centered and we have not done a good job of
promoting ourselves as a value
added."
In evaluating the impact ofbillable hours, one is reminded of the initial
workers'
compensation debate between the rugged individualism ofconservative philosophy and
the common good ofprogressive philosophy. Billable hours as a performance standard
will do a good job of improving individual accountability, butmakes individual
accountability for profit, the only real measure of success. Since customer service is not
billable it is often left unmeasured and undone. The qualitymetric is largely driven by
internal standards that are frequently inconsequential to the external client. The client is
rarely contacted for a determination of the quality ofrisk control services and customer
service is a known, but unacknowledged issue because it cannot be provided without a
billable hours allocation.
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5.0 Conclusion
The origins ofworkers' compensation were a most interesting study. Wisconsin's
workers'
compensation program of 191 1 is most commonly mentioned in this research,
but assumptions are thatworkers'compensation began in earnest in the 1970s along with
OSHA and more modem institutions. The level ofdiscourse in the late 1800s was
surprising. The average person would be surprised to find that the initial workmen's
compensation angle was to provide a forty-hour work week to women and children, but
men had to continue to work sixty-hour work weeks. In fact, the initial programwas to
compensate widows ofhusbands that were killed, but not to compensate a husband for a
wife that was killed. . .thus, the title, workmen's compensation. Some historians argue
thatworkers'compensation would not have been instituted without the initial pictures of
destitute widows and children which were taken and published by Hines. This led to the
surprising findings of the dispute between the conservative "survival of the
fittest"
mentality and the progressives of the day that had a "group
good"
mentality. Ofcourse
they were labeledwith the term
"socialist"
at the time.
The distinction between free labor and slave labor was surprisingly a substantive
part of the debate regarding workmen's compensation. Very thought provoking can one
be a slave and still get paid for your work? Ifone gets paid but is treated like a slave, are
you free? Is itmoney or pay that defines an employee or is it autonomy and growth
potential, etc.? Workers were injured at an alarming rate without substantial concern
from business owners until employers understood the autonomy of employees and the
right for decentwages, working hours, family considerations and safe working
conditions. This is why the
workers'
compensation question was so controversial. The
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answer to these questions would radically change the working dynamics of employer and
employee relations. Many employers felt that the only difference between slaves and
employees is that the employees were paid. They felt they had the right to literally treat
their employees as slaves, as long as they were paid. The number ofpoverty-ridden
immigrants to the United States made it possible to treat people like slaves and still retain
them as workers. When one's family is starving, the job is apparently more important
than
workers'
rights.
Workers'
compensation was force feeding the country an entirely
different work ethic and code of responsibility.
At first the employee was responsible for his/her injuries under the concept that an
employee knows the hazards of the workplace and is therefore accepting of the dangers,
whatever theymay be. There was also a doctrine that held employees responsible for
other employees. With this concept, employees had little chance ofwinning lawsuits
against employers. Of course, this is aside from the fact that people were too poor to sue
anyway.
The political debate between progressives and conservatives rages on. The
language and words are the same now regarding issues forwhich doors were opened
during theworkers'compensation debate. Issues such as unemployment insurance,
Social Security, and national health care planning were opened for discussion by the
workers'
compensation issue. Even today, it is broadly the conservative view of"every
man for himself' versus the progressive "common
good"
when considering such issues as
Social Security and national health care.
Modern risk control has been severely impacted by a downsizedworld. Strangely,
inmy opinion, the downsizing seemed to follow application of
Demings' TQM
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philosophy. In an effort to make everyone accountable, all departments were made profit
centers. In the case ofpure customer service type departments, there was no viable place
to hide these charges. It was common knowledge and practice that risk control was at one
time considered a customer service expense, for which up to 5 percent ofpremiums were
set aside, although unknown to the client. This was a time when insurance
companies'
risk control departments were the vanguard of the safety movement to protect the assets
of the insurance company. Often, the risk control consultant is much tougher than OSHA
or the fire department and the client will ask "why?" The answer is that the fire
department only has to put out the fire, the insurance company has to pay for it.
The positive side of theworkers'compensation debate was and remains, although
less so, an incentive to make facilities safer. At its origins,
workers'
compensation was
instituted for that very reason and in response to accidents correlated to the Industrial
Revolution. In fact, the management system approachwas chosen as a direction in its
originating formation. Ultimately, there is amorality to safety professions that are not
evident in some other professions. It is likely thatmost EHS professionals take seriously
the goal ofestablishingmanagement systems to correct EHS problems. However, it
seems that companies have become accepting of simple improvement, despite stated
goals ofzero defects. Unfortunately, this maymean that continuing to hurt a lesser
proportion ofthe workforce has become acceptable. Slowly, but inexorably, the real
goals often moved from zero defects to the 'most improved award.'
Few historians give the development ofworker's compensation credit for accident
reduction, but most creditworker's compensation for the development of safety
programs. One may perceive this to be due to a continuation of the political
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interpretations. Assuming that safety programs have an impact on safety, how can the
correlation between worker's compensation, improved safety programs and consequential
accident reduction be denied? Although in the latest years, industrial safety is probably
impacted by the liability incentives for overall safety. The reduction in workplace deaths
has occurred in the context ofextensive changes in U.S. economic activity, the U.S.
industrial mix, and workforce demographics. Society wide progress in injury control also
contributes to saferworkplacesfor example, use of safety belts and other safety features
inmotor vehicles and improvements in medical care for trauma victims.(Weitz and
Luxemburg) This has impacted workplace exposures and industrial accidents. It is this
merging ofworker's compensation and liability concerns that has maintained safety
reduction in recent years, although correlating proactive actions by the insurance industry
have been reduced. If today's workforce of approximately 130 million had the same risk
as workers in 1933 for dying from injuries, then an additional 40,000 workers would have
died in 1997 from preventable events (CDC, unpublished data, 1999).
The National Safety Council estimated that in 1912, 18,000-21,000 workers died
from work-related injuries.(National Safety Council 1998) In 1913, the Bureau ofLabor
Statistics documented approximately 23,000 industrial deaths among aworkforce of38
million, equivalent to a rate of61 deaths per 100,000 workers. (BLS 1999) Under a
different reporting system, data from theNational Safety Council from 1933 through
1997 indicate that deaths from unintentional work-related injuries declined 90%, from 37
per 100,000 workers to 4 per 100,000(National Safety Council 1998). The corresponding
annual number ofdeaths decreased from 14,500 to 5 100; during this same period, the
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workforce more than tripled, from 39 million to approximately 130 million.(Weitz and
Luxemburg)
This improvement occurred prior to OSHA and other such regulatory standards.
The main program incentive wasworkers'compensation.
In the interviews for the second part of this thesis, most of the concerns were
affirmed. The speech and survey conducted by Pat Allen concurred with most of the
views of those interviewed. It is merely a matter of logical deduction that when policies
are written with million dollar deductibles per occurrence, underwriters are unconcerned
with safety until it gets close to a million dollars for any single incident. Deductibles
serve to provide a safe zone for insurance companies, within which they no longer have to
do anything. It defeats one of the original purposes for establishing the entire
workers'
compensation system. Only in the event ofamajor catastrophe, will risk control be
allowed to assist that client, unless the client asks to purchase risk control services
separately. Unfortunately, many (maybe most) business managers are not aware ofhow
deficient their programs are. Ifone does not realize the deficiency, then he will likely not
ask for help and certainlywill not spend money on consultants.
The clarification of the history and politics of the
workers'
compensation issue
reflect issues that are ensconced in the same jargon, pejoratives, and passion as the 1880s.
The impact ofworkers'compensation dynamics on the rest of society, includingmajor
initiatives in 2005, such as healthcare and Social Security is part of the workers'
compensation continuum. The country's confusion regarding free labor versus slave
laborwas surprising and thought provoking. The excess profitmotive was just as
onerous then as it is now. The interviews indicate other risk control consultants to have
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problems with trends towards downsizing. Some, including myself, thought the
misapplication ofTQM led to reorganizations within companies that made every
department a profit center. This means that everythingmust be cost or profit justified,
even when servicing other portions of the same company. Knowledgeable persons
understand that not everything is billable. Some things are a cost ofcustomer service, yet
the command to "bill everything"is the new standard. Since this standard cannot
possibly be met in a customer service environment, TQM has allowed employees the
'freedom'
to work extra hours due to their professionalism, without charge to the
insurance company. As one interviewee indicated, "work 50 hours in order to bill 40
hours." Because of this, a customer is often given "as much safety as they can
afford."
How ironic that a primary driver ofDeming's philosophy - customer service - has been
minimized based on the misapplication ofTQM principles for accountability and the
transition ofrisk control to a profit center. The more money the insurance company
makes, the less customer service or value added, is provided to the customer.
Interviewees also agreed that risk control service is subject to a change in ethics
based on application ofdeductibles. This is tme of fiduciary responsibilities as
consulting has transitioned from "the eyes and ears of
underwriting,"
to being paid as
third-party administration consultants. Everyone seems to have found a comfortable
place to store the inherent cognitive dissonance associated with tying safety so directly to
howmuchmoney is available. Everyone seemed to concur that the concept of safety has
shifted to financial risk transfer. If the underwriter can transfer the cost of risk to another
party, particularly through deductibles, then they no longer provide a budget for EHS
concerns.
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Many in the risk control community are reticent to speak about the ethical
challenges of the current risk control discipline and the requirement to find a way to bill
for all ofwhat was formerly customer service. The origins ofworkers'compensation and
the politics involved were surprising in that they appear to mirror the conservative and
progressive debates of2005. ..rugged individualism versus common good. It is the
coalescence of the TQM- related conversion to profit centers, downsizing at unparalleled
rates, the emphasis on performance by billable hours, the use ofdeductibles for risk
transfer and self-insured programs, the takeover ofRisk Control by financial managers
and untenable profit standards that have altered the objectives of insurance and Risk
Control.
All of the interviewees expressed varying degrees of concern that there is no
pipeline in the insurance industry for introducing new blood. In response to Pat Allen's
survey, many indicated theywould not suggest a young person seek this field for
employment a beliefthat was verified during the interviews for this project. As one
interviewee indicated, "training is now considered an expense, while it used to be
considered an
investment." Pat Allen indicates over 50 percent of risk control
professionals are preparing for retirement due to age and burnout. Much of the burnout
has to do with charges being based on billable hours. Because there is a direct bill to the
client, only the clients with money get serviced. A consultant cannot perform what used
to be customer service, as itmay result in an unexpected bill to the client
A major part of the problem is that since risk control has become a profit center, it
is not being led by risk control people. Instead, financial people are giving the orders and
setting the performance standards. The standards are mostly related to the number of
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billable hours revenue for which a consultant is responsible. The issue has become the
amount of profit possible from risk control services, rather than customer service or even
safety. This appears to be particularly true when deductibles are involved. In fact one
must either avoid traditional, non-billable customer service or "eat" the hours to the
consultant's detriment
A final observation has to do with the importance of 'changemanagement,'but
from the perspective of senior managers. Ultimately, many have the objective of
profitability, which everyone must accept as an honorable and legitimate objective. The
issue becomes difficultwhen senior management retains the profitability goal without
consideration to the tasks performed. Frequently, accomplishment ofgoals ismanaged
by across-the-board mandates such as "a 10 percent reduction from every department" or
"a 25 percent increase in revenue."As one interviewee stated, "there is a
progression. . .25 percent revenue increase this year. . .then next year too. . .then next year
after that, then. . . Yet there had been no appreciable increase ofemployees or clients
correlating to the 25 percent mandate in order to increase the
revenue."The result is
unrealistic goals, set by persons that do not understand the job parameters. If the
hierarchy is of the command and control variety, it is likely that the departmentmanager
will be reticent to firmly let senior management know when they issue an edict that is
untenable.
Demingwould likely be astonished by the apparent misapplication ofhis
customer service and TQM principles. Whatwould he say ifone were to inform him that
a company used his principles and now has no budget for customer service? Or how
would the statement "give them as much safety as they can
afford" fit into TQM? Would
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ignoring safety issues up to the point of insurance deductibles be acceptable? Is there an
acceptable ratio between company profits and loss of customer service?
An education for those financial leaders that have overall responsibility for risk
control, would be helpful. Across-the-board edicts for cuts or revenue enhancements are
the lazy person's method ofmanagement. They do not account for human and
management variables. For example, such edicts may not consider the manager that
already is operating as efficiently as possible. Instead, the good manager and his staff
will be punished as if they were poor and poor managers will be rewarded as if they were
efficient. Employees are expected to work through change and answer the ambiguities or
other problems that change inevitably brings. Uppermanagement must do the same and
particularly take the time to educate themselves about the specifics, otherwise intelligent
people will make decisions that contradict their very goals.
I believe that if senior management was asked the same questions as those
suggested to be asked ofDeming, they would respond similarly. It would be difficult to
believe that they would accept the fact that customer service is not a priority in a billable
hours and high deductible environment, yet do nothing to change. Somehow, mid-
management has done a poor job communicating to senior management regarding the real
world within which customer service groups, such as risk control, operate. They simply
need to educate themselves so they know that the questions are pertinent. Until then,
goals such as sustainability are seldom discussed, are often unheard of, and certainly
receive no expense allocation. At some point, the liability of ignoring important liability-
related safety issueswill catch up to the willful ignorance that ismotivated by excessive
profitmotive.
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Coda; The question ofwhat to do about the issues addressed in this work is
important to answer:
1 . In keeping with the management systems and organizational approach to business
decisions and losses, financial leaders must bring risk control leaders into the
equation for setting profitability goals. The goals must correlate to actual sources of
revenue, otherwise there is a motivation for development ofgimmicks to make money
rather than effective risk control. Gimmicks destroy the credibility of risk control and
sometimes turn an engineering discipline to something akin to used car sales.
2. Engineersmust be allowed to be 75% engineers, and 25% sales persons. In fact, some
engineers are not capable ofcold sales.
3 . The sales element should come from excellence ofwork product and resultant
requests by clients for additional assistance, not knocking on doors.
4. TQM and customer service must be revived. A realistic budget for customer service,
within risk control must be established.
5. The risk control staffmust be balanced so that there is a range ofpay scales to handle
the range of client types. A range ofpay scales aligned to experience, beginning at
around $30,000, should bemaintained for cost-effective use ofstaff.
6. Risk control departments must decide who they are. Will they service clients or will
they be account managers who manage outside vendors? Themixture sometimes
causes consultants who work under the billable hour system to have to 'eat' time in
order to provide excellent customer service.
7. Elements such as training and certifications must return to being seen as an
investment in the department rather than expense items.
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Ultimately, the professionalism and ethics of the seasoned risk control consultant
has proven to be the primary driver of sustained quality and safety. Most will
'eat'
time
personally, rather than give a client the impression that there is no real customer service
budget. A common phrase amongst risk control consultants is "give them 50 to get your
40." The interpretation is that a consultant will have to work ten extra hours in order to
bill 40 hours per week. Many complain about this because most are salaried employees
even though their standards are to provide billable hours. The company does nothing to
significantly reward the employee for the extra customer service hours. Often these hours
are not even tracked.
Finally, I hope that the most damaging parts of the current state of risk control are
part ofcyclical changes. The downsizing element is not cyclical. I doubt that risk control
will ever exist in the numbers typical of the 1980s. The profit motive is an honorable one
but when customer service is sacrificed to the degree that there is no significant budget
that motive is demeaned. I am particularly concerned that many do not see a future in
risk control, a field forwhich I am immensely proud.
Ultimately, I am convinced that the value of risk control will be proven a
necessity and should be part of themanagement systems approachwhich is a rising global
trend. I trust this will be part of the next cycle.
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Appendix A
Long-Term Trends inWorkers' Compensation Coverage and Costs
Year Share of WC Cost of WC Medical Disability Survivor
wage and benefits WC benefits as and payments payments
salary paid in programs percent of hospital as percent as percent
payments 1996 as percent covered payments ofwage ofwage
to workers dollars ofcovered payroll3as percent and and
covered by payroll3 ofwage salaries salaries
WC and
salaries
covered
covered
byWC
covered
byWC
; __
jbyWC
;
Percent $ (millions) percent percent percent percent percent
1940 73.6 2686 1.2 0.7 0.27 0.36 0.09
1941 na 2839 na na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
1942 na 2859 na na
1943 na 2862; na na
1944 na 3047 na; na na na naj
1945 63.0 3148 na na 0.17 0.33 0.06 :
1946
_ __
j
71.4' 2997 j 0.9 0.5 0.18 0.31 0.06
1947 74.3
S
3000; na na 0.17 0.31 0.05
1948 77.5; 3090 i 1.0| 0.5 0.17 0.29 0.05
1949 76.4; 3296 j i.o! 0.6 0.18 0.32 0.05!
1950
i
77.2] 3532; 0.9! 0.5 0.18 0.32 0.05|
1951 76.8 j
i
3815J 0.9; 0.5 0.18 0.32 0.05 \
76.3
77.3
77.7
79.4
79.5
4132
4387
4503
4641
4909
0.9
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.18
0.18
0.20
0.19
0.19
Eure
0.33
0.32
0.33
0.31
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1952
1953
1954
1955
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.04
1956
i
0.32 0.04
1957* 79.4 5017
5121
5485
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.19
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.22
0.32
0.34
0.33
0.34
0.04
1958J 79.8
80.7
0.05
1959j
>
0.6 0.05
1960 80.9 5789
.
0.9 0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.05
1961 81.0
80.9
6074:
6494
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.35:
0.36
0.37
0.05
1962 0.05
1963 81.0 6822 0.05
1964 80.9
*
7251
7565
8107*
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.37
0.37
0.36
0.38
0.05
1965
1966
80.7
80.6
0.05
0.05
1967 80.1 8608 1.1 0.05
1968 80.0 8956 l.ll 0.6 0.22 0.37 0.04
1969|
i
80.3 9471 1.1}
0.6;
0.22 ; 0.37
0.401970J 80.4 ! 10348; 1.1 0.7 0.24; 0.05
1971; 80.7| 11557 1.1! 0.7; 0.24- 0.44! 0.08
1972J
i
80.6 12620 i.i 0.7 1 0.24? 0.46 0.09,
i f
\ 1973! 82.3; 15000; 1.2 j o.7; 0.26 0.51? 0.12 t
1974J
i
83.2: 15641; 1.2; 0.8 0.28;
1
~ '
0.53^ 0.11]i
84.1
84.3
84.1
83.4
16344 1.3 0.8
0.9
0.9
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.1
0.30
0.32
0.32
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1975 0.57
0.59
0.61
0.11
1976
1977
17724
18930
20094
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.0
2.0
1.9
0.11
0.11
1978 0.32
0.34
0.35
0.36
0.39
0.63^
0.69
0.74
0.74
0.76
0.10
1979
I
84.1 22822
23733
24010
0.12
1980
1981
82.8
82.6
0.12
0.11
1982 82.0 24668 1.8 1.2 0.11
1983 82.4 25383
27416
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.2
1.2
1.3
0.41
0.42
0.75;
0.77
0.11
1984 82.4 0.11
1985 81.9 30003 0.46 0.81 0.10
1986' 82.3 32531
35094
38159
41067
2.0
2.1
2.2
'
2.3
1.4
1.4
1.5
1.6
0.50
0.54
0.58
0.63
0.62;
0.83
0.86
0.88
0.91
0.87;
0.10
1987 82.0 0.09
1988 81.8
81.8
89.0
0.08
1989: 0.08
1990 44037 2.4: 1.7 0.08
1991 90.3 i 46981 2.4 1.8 0.66 0.92; 0.08
1992; 90.4| 49802 2.4; 1.9 0.68 0.90! 0.07;
1993; 90.7 i 48141 2.4 1 1.8 0.63! 0.84; 0.07
1994J 91.0 46376 2.3 1.7 0.58
l 0.86 0.07
1995!
i !1 *
91.0s 44173;
i
2.1j
}
1.6 0.54i 0.79 0.06!
a Theworkers' compensation series on costs as a percentage of the covered payroll
(pvf.b.18.10) contains some employer contributions to the Black Lung program while the
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benefits series (pvf.b.18.1 1) does not include benefits associated with the Black Lung
program.
Sources: 1939-1967, AlfredM. Skolnik and Daniel N. Price, "Another Look at
Workmen's Compensation," in United States Social Security Administration, Social
Security Bulletin 33 (October 1970), pp. 3-25; 1968-1986, United States Social Security
Administration, Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1994, Table
9.B1, p. 333; 1992-1993, Jack Schmulowitz, "Workers' Compensation: Coverage,
Benefits, and Costs, 1992-93," Social Security Bulletin 58 (Summer 1995), pp. 51-57. For
1987 through 1998, National Academy ofSocial Insurance,
"Workers' Compensation:
Benefits, Coverage and Costs, 1997-1998 New
Estimates." The publication is available at
theNational Academy ofSocial Science website: http://www.nasi.org/.
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State Year State Legislature
First Enacted a General
Law"
Method of
Insurance11
New York 1910 (1913)1 Competitive State0
California 1911 Competitive State0
Illinois 1911 Private
Kansas 1911 Private
Massachusetts 1911 Private
New Hampshire 1911 Private
New Jersey 1911 Private
Ohio 1911 State
Washington 1911 State
Wisconsin 1911 Private
Marylandf 1912 Competitive State
Michigan 1912 Competitive State
Rhode Island 1912
1913
1913
Private
Arizona Competitive State
Connecticut Private
Iowa 1913 Private
Minnesota 1913 Private
Nebraska 1913 Private
Nevada 1913 State
NewYork1 1913 Competitive State
Oregon 1913 State
Texas 1913 Private
WestVirginia 1913 State
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Louisiana 1914 Private
Kentucky 1914(1916)" Private
Colorado 1915 Competitive State
Indiana 1915 Private
Maine 1915 Private
Montanaf
1915 Competitive State
Oklahoma 1915 Private
Pennsylvania 1915 Competitive State
Vermont 1915 Private
Wyoming 1915 State
Delaware 1917 Private
Idaho 1917 Competitive State
NewMexico 1917 Private
South Dakota 1917 Private
Utah 1917 Competitive State
Virginia 1918 Private
Alabama 1919 Private
North Dakota 1919 State
Tennessee 1919 Private
Missouri
1919(1926)" Private
Georgia 1920 Private
North Carolina 1929 Private
Florida 1935 Private
South Carolina
Arkansas
1935 Private
1939 Private
Mississippi 1948 Private
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Source: Fishback and Kantor, 2000, pp. 103-4.
a Some general laws were enacted by legislatures but were declared unconstitutional. The
years that the law was permanently established are in parentheses. New York passed a
compulsory law in 1910 and an elective law in 1910, but the compulsory law was
declared unconstitutional, and the elective law saw little use. New York passed a
compulsory law in 1913 after passing a constitutional amendment. The Kentucky law of
1914 was declared unconstitutional and was replaced by a law in 1916. TheMissouri
General Assembly passed a workers' compensation law in 1919, but it failed to receive
enough votes in a referendum in 1920. Another law passed in 1921 was defeated in a
referendum in 1922 and an initiative on the ballot was again defeated in 1924. Missouri
voters finally approved aworkers' compensation law in a 1926 referendum on a 1925
legislative act. Maryland (1902) andMontana (1909) passed earlier laws specific to
miners that were declared unconstitutional.
b Competitive state insurance allowed employers to purchase theirworkers'compensation
insurance from either private insurance companies or the state. Amonopoly state fund
required employers to purchase their policies through the state's fund. Most states also
allowed firms to self-insure ifthey couldmeet certain financial solvency tests.
c California andNew York established their competitive state funds in 1913.
d The initial laws in Ohio, Illinois, and Californiawere elective. Ohio and California in
1913 and Illinois later established compulsory laws.
e
Illinois' initial law was administered by the courts; they switched to a commission in
1913.
fEmployees have option to collect compensation or sue for damages after injury.
g Compulsory formotor bus industry only.
h Compulsory for coal mining only.
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Appendix C
Shares ofWorkers' Compensation Payments Made by Types of Insurer (E.H. Net)
Year Private Insurer Government Self-Insurance
Fund
Percent percent
28.5
26.5
24.7
Percent
1940
1941 ,
1942
52.7
55.0
57.9
18.8
18.6
17.4
1943 60.3 22.9 16.7
1944
1945
61.4
61.9
22.3
22.2
16.3
15.9
i
1946 ; 62.2 22.1 15.7
1947 62.1 22.6 15.2
1948 62.7 22.7 14.6
1949 62.4 23.3 14.3
1950 |
i i
62.0 ! 24'2
' | 13.8 <
\
1951 ! 62.7 24.0 13.3
1952 \ 62.5
i [
24.6
i 1
12.9
5
1953 62.3 25.0 12.7
1954 61.7 25.7
26.0
12.6
i i955 i 61.5 12.6
; 1956 |i 61.7 25.8 as 1
1957 62.2 25.5 12.2
{
I 1958 I 62.5
i'
!
25.7 11.9
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1959 62.2
1960 62.5
1961 61.9
1962 62.1
1963 62.4
1964 62.6
1965 62.0
1966 ; 62.0
1967 62.2
1968 62.4
26.1
25.1
25.3
24.9
24.5
24.1
24.5
24.3
23.9
23.4
1969 62.3 23.0
1970 60.8 24.9
1971
1972
56.3
53.6
30.8
33.9
11.7
12.4
12.8
13.0
13.1
13.2
13.5
13.8
13.8
14.2
14.7
14.3
12.9
12.4
1973 49.3 39.1 11.6
; 1974 ; 51.4 36.1 12.5
1975 i 51.9 j 35.2 12.9 I
1976 !
i. \
52.4 ! 33.9 13.7
1977 | 53.6 31.9 14.5 !
i
| 1978 | 53.7 31.1 15.3
1979 j 51.2 33.4 15.4
1980 ! 51.6 31.8 16.6
1981 | 52.3 30.5 17.2i !
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1982 52.7 29.1 18.2
1983 52.7 28.8 18.5
1984 53.9 27.5 18.6
1985 55.5 25.9 18.6
1986 ; 56.2
1987 56.6
25.4 18.4
24.8 18.6
1988 57.0 24.3 18.7
1989 58.0 23.2 18.7
1990 58.1
1991 58.1
22.9 19.0
23.0 18.8
, 1992 55.4 23.4 21.3
1993 53.2 23.3 23.4
1994 ; 50.0 24.1 25.9
! 1995 48.8
1996 48.8
25.4 25.9
25.4 25.8
1997 50.8 24.9 24.3
1998 53.3 24.8 21.9
Sources: See Previous Table
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Appendix D
Characteristics ofWorkers' Compensation Laws in the United States, 1910-1930
State Year State Legislature
First Enacted a
General Law*
Method of Insurance1*
New York 1910(1913)a Competitive Statec
California 1911 Competitive State0
Illinois 1911 Private
Kansas 1911 Private
Massachusetts 1911 Private
New Hampshire 1911 Private
New Jersey 1911 Private
StateOhio 1911
Washington 1911 State
Wisconsin 1911 Private
Marylandf 1912 Competitive State
Michigan 1912 Competitive State
Rhode Island 1912 Private
Arizona 1913 Competitive State
Connecticut 1913 Private
Iowa 1913 Private
Minnesota 1913
1913
Private
Nebraska Private
Nevada 1913 State
New York 1913 Competitive State
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Oregon 1913 State
Texas 1913 Private
West Virginia 1913 State
Louisiana 1914 Private
Kentucky 1914(1916)a Private
Colorado 1915 Competitive State
Indiana 1915 Private
Maine 1915 Private
Montanaf 1915 Competitive State
Oklahoma 1915 Private
Pennsylvania 1915 Competitive State
Vermont 1915 Private
Wyoming 1915 State
Delaware 1917 Private
Idaho 1917 Competitive State
NewMexico 1917 Private
South Dakota 1917 Private
Utah 1917 Competitive State
Virginia 1918 Private
Alabama 1919 Private
North Dakota 1919 State
Tennessee 1919 Private
Missouri 1919 (1926)a Private
PrivateGeorgia 1920
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North Carolina 1929 Private
Florida 1935 Private
South Carolina 1935 Private
Arkansas 1939 Private
Mississippi 1948 Private
Source: Fishback and Kantor, 2000, pp. 103-4.
A Some general laws were enacted by legislatures but were declared unconstitutional.
The years that the law was permanently established are in parentheses. New York passed
a compulsory law in 1910 and an elective law in 1910, but the compulsory lawwas
declared unconstitutional, and the elective law saw little use. New York passed a
compulsory law in 1913 after passing a constitutional amendment. The Kentucky law of
1914 was declared unconstitutional and was replaced by a law in 1916. TheMissouri
General Assembly passed aworkers' compensation law in 1919, but it failed to receive
enough votes in a referendum in 1920. Another law passed in 1921 was defeated in a
referendum in 1922 and an initiative on the ballotwas again defeated in 1924. Missouri
voters finally approved aworkers' compensation law in a 1926 referendum on a 1925
legislative act. Maryland (1902) andMontana (1909) passed earlier laws specific to
miners that were declared unconstitutional.
B Competitive state insurance allowed employers to purchase theirworkers'
compensation insurance from either private insurance companies or the state. A
monopoly state fund required employers to purchase their policies through the state's
fund. Most states also allowed firms to self-insure if they couldmeet certain financial
solvency tests.
C California andNew York established their competitive state funds in 1913.
D The initial laws in Ohio, Illinois, and Californiawere elective. Ohio and California in
1913 and Illinois later established compulsory laws.
E Illinois' initial lawwas administered by the courts; they switched to a commission in
1913.
F Employees have option to collect compensation or sue for damages after injury.
G Compulsory formotor bus industry only.
H Compulsory for coal mining only.
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APPENDIX E
PAT ALLEN ASSOCIATES, INC.
LOSS CONTROL SURVEY. OCTOBER. 2003
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS:
This survey and speech were prepared for presentation to the attendees of
the ISO, E&S Loss Control Executive Forum in Anaheim, California on
November 6, 2003.
The object of the survey was to collect an accurate account ofwhat today's
loss control professionals are tliinking, feeling and anticipating about the
future of their profession.
A link to the survey was emailed to 1,200 loss control professionals and
found its way onto several newsgroups. It was available on our website
http://www.patallen.com for approximately 6 weeks.
The number of respondents totaled 319, which seems to represent
approximately 3percent of the candidate pool. We, also found that
throughout the collection process the answers remained surprisingly
consistent. Therefore, we feel the results offer reliable insights.
The survey was intentionally geared to the field loss control consultant.
We formulated survey questions with input from various managers,
consultants and human resources professionals.
We wish to thank all the people who were so helpful to us. We truly enjoyed the
experience. We hope that this information provides a tool that can be used in your
planning when facing loss control issues. Hopefully, it will clarify your approach
to the development and success ofyour loss control department.
Sincerely,
Pat and Dennis Allen
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INSURANCE LOSS CONTROL
FROM 1999 TO TODAY AND BEYOND
AND
SURVEY RESULTS FROM THE FIELD
PRESENTED TO
ISO, E&S LOSS CONTROL EXECUTIVE FORUM
ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA NOVEMBER 6, 2003
WWW.PATALLEN.COM
PAT ALLEN ASSOCIATES, INC.
BOX 716, 40 INDIAN FULL
ROAD
GOLDENS BRIDGE, NY, 10526
PAT ALLEN, CPC, (914) 232-1545
DENNIS ALLEN, (518) 284-2972
DENNIS@PATALLEN.COM
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PAT ALLEN SPEECH, NOVEMBER 6, 2003
Four years ago in April of 1999, 1 stood before this group in Hutchinson Island, Florida
and spoke about the current state of staffing in the loss control industry. I had never given
a presentation before, and tmthfully in 25 years of recmiting, I had never attended an
ASSE conference or any industrymeeting. I was only a voice on the phone. It was the
managers from Reliance Insurance who convinced me to take that step. Today, more than
halfof the people who were in that room are not with us now. Most fell victim to the
industry consolidation. At times, I wondered if I would weather the storm myself and I
am sure halfofyou sitting here wondered the same. I wasn't really sure ifanyone listened
to what I said that day, but someone must have been because one ofmy statements spread
from coast to coast like wildfire. What I said was that the insurance loss control pool,
which once had 18,000 viable candidates was reduced overnight by almost 50percent.
This statement became the wake up call for our industry and the reality that our candidate
pool was in crisis and quickly disappearing hit home. It created such a stir that I promised
myself that I'd be more careful about what I say to you this time.
For those ofus with shortmemories, 1999 was the dawn of the Internet age and getting
on line was critical. The Internetmade job searching a simple process. Internet job boards
increased employees'awareness of immediate alternative career options while email pink
slips were making a debut as the newest form of layoffs. The daily rounds of re-
engineering shook the loyalty ofemployees everywhere and at all levels.
Globalizationwas the major focus of the world. NAFTA contributed to the start of the
mass exodus ofmanufacturing jobs outside ofthe United States For every 500
manufacturing jobs lost to foreign soil, one safetymanager's career was put in jeopardy.
While this was going on, outsourcing and the unbundling of services were thriving in the
loss control industry spurred on by the ever-present desire to increase income and reduce
expenses. Field positions were evaporating and those who were left were doing more for
less. IT and on-line reporting promised untold freedoms withmore time in home-based
virtual offices and increased productivity. However, the newmethod ofpreparing reports
often became burdensome as companies and employees struggled to implement systems
that never existed before. The sum total of these forces left a diminished applicant pool
confused, depressed and concerned about their survival.
From that point in 1999, some of these trends have continued to accelerate andmost of
the issues we faced ten years ago have not gone away. But two new issues had amajor
impact on everyone. The first one was the surprise attack on the world trade center that
raised the public's awareness of terrorism and hazard exposures. Corporate awareness of
disaster recoverymoved into the forefront. The second was the rapid decline of the stock
market, which put additional pressure on underwriters to produce profits. It also reduced
the value of40Ik's that postponed the retirement ofmany employees. Within the
insurance industry, there are 7 specific forces that shape the profile of today's applicant.
1) Consolidation continues to dominate our industry and the elimination ofReliance,
IRI, Royal SunAlliance and one of the biggest surprises; Kemper Insurance has
put our dream ofworking in a secure environment on hold. The advance to only 8
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or 10 major players as predicted years ago moves closer to reality. The flood of
talent released by these companies gave us a reprieve in the bench strength that we
lacked over the last ten years. Of the 85 Kemper engineers that were reengineered,
90percent of them already had new positions in the Insurance industry before their
last day ofwork. This was due to a concerted effort on the part ofBob Hiltz and
his loss control managers to make every effort to help place their people and to the
desirability of the skills possessed by Kemper's engineering staff. They were
gobbled up by an industry desperate for good people and at salaries in the high
70'
s and
80'
s. Now, with the addition to our pool ofabout 175 Royal engineers
who are mostly casualty driven, the market in my opinion is temporarily flooded.
2) The lack of systemic multi-line training programs by the insurance industry
continued until just this last year. With the passage oftime, the median age of the
loss control professional advanced by five years, and the gap between the
seasoned professionals and the younger candidates widened.
3) The rapid rise in the use ofoutside loss control services has fostered the emergence
of three distinct groups; the empowered self-employed safety professional
providing consultative services, the large fee companies and the one man shops
concentrating on contract survey work. This coincided with the decline of in-
house loss control departments. It is not unusual for an employee re-engineered on
Friday afternoon to emerge onMondaymorning as an independentmany times
with their old employer as their biggest client. From w2's to 1099's overnight and
one more expense off the books. Many consultants, reaching an age in their lives
when career development was no longer the main priority, were tired ofall the
uncertainty and welcomed the opportunity to negotiate packages, take control of
their future and productivity goals. They welcomed the chance to integrate their
skills with their business expertise. They have developed a direct client base and
are providing personalized safety consulting in a work place that they can impact.
However, if they decide theywant to work for a company again, it is almost
always true that a loss control manager will gladly hire a proven consultant with
proactive skills and good business sense. (So find one that wants to come in from
the cold.) Until recently these independents have been busy and were reluctant to
give up their new venture. However, we are starting to hear from more of them
that their opportunities are drying up. Theymay be more receptive to the idea of
returning to an insurance position with salary and benefits.
4) The one market that has experienced tremendous growth is undoubtedly the larger
fee companies. Formerly, contract employers, these companies are developing
national loss control staffs with branch offices inmost of the major cities. Some
are hiring trainees and trainers for staffdevelopment. Quality control report
reviewers are making sure the finished report meets higher standards. With this
new talent in place, these companies are expanding from basic surveys to service
and consulting providers. They realize that timeliness and quality have been their
two biggest challenges, and they are working very hard at improving both. In the
insurance industry, seniormanagement has always looked for ways to take the
cost out ofdoing business and outsourcing has always been one solution. With
their competitive pricing, fee companies are becoming amajor threat to
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established loss control departments, and they are also becoming a viable career
option. This industry has absorbedmore applicants from our pool than any other.
One reason is that they are very flexible and able to offer a broader range of
options to potential candidates than their competition. Full- time positions with
benefits, and car allowances are commonplace. Part-time or lOOpercent
commission basis are also options. Many times, they are able to provide enough
work in most geographic locations to justify an additional employee, eliminating
the need for unwelcome relocations. As recruiters, we always thought the biggest
problem for engineers transitioning to fee companies would be in the lack of
technical challenge. But this has not been the case. The transition for many
candidates is very difficult, andmany do not make it at all. Productivity
expectations are demanding and the range of reports and product lines is much
more complex. Notmuch lead-time is allowed and new hires who fall behind
schedule quickly find themselves out on the street. The situation is different for
many traditional loss control managers and directors who have found that
applying their experience in this arena works very well. They enjoy having the
freedom ofcombining their management skills and technical knowledge with the
ability to impact the bottom line ofan organization. The.migration ofmany well
thought ofprofessionals to this sector has helped to elevate the image of the fee
company as an attractive career option. Whether or not fee companies will gain
more ground and replace traditional loss control departments remains one of the
biggest open questions. It is critical for Insurance loss control managers to prove
the value of their departments if they are to survive and prevent outside sources
from replacing them. An out-sourced report is only economical if it is accurate
enough for its conclusions to be counted upon and insurance professionals have an
on-going commitment to their accounts and a long-term goal of lowering losses.
When an account is out-sourced, this personal interest is gone. Until human
behavior changes, there will always be a need for expert verification ofthe
existing status of the insured. Another considerationwith regard to fee companies
is that we have started hearing from various managers that itmay be time for them
to start thinking about their replacement. Certainly provenmanagement and
experience with outsourcing will be the major qualifications. If insurance
companies do not revive working supervisor roles for younger consultants then
the fee company sectormay very well become the preferred management talent
source of the future.
5) The emphasis on property/package underwriting drove loss control needs and
staffing for the last four years. Carriers scrambled to find HPR engineers or
qualifiedmulti-line candidates with better than average property skills. This
domination of the market by property driven forces seriously reduced the demand
for casualty oriented service types. Years have passed since we did a search for
industrial hygiene or ergonomics specialists. Even demand for casualty driven
field people has dried up. Only portfolio or accountmanagers to handle the
service to select national accounts penetrated the need for property specialists.
6) The number ofnationwide insurers writing large national/global accounts
diminished to only a handful. Meanwhile the competition formiddle market
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business has become so intense thatwe all know it is only a matter of time until
more companies fail. The downgrades by A.M. Best keep coming. Any training
efforts at all by the carriers, whether nationwide or regional, were focused mainly
on servicing small packages or BOP accounts that filled the needs of this growing
market. At least these candidates have a broad enough foundation on which to
build in all the lines ofbusiness.
7) Years ago, we had the enterprising workers comp carriers emerging as the new
comers to the Insurance industry. Many of these have since fallen by the wayside
and today it is the regional carriers and niche companies that are picking up the
slack left by these and other industry consolidations. They are quickly spreading
and increasing their geographic reach and share ofbusiness at a fast rate. Some of
these companies have tripled their premiums in a few short years. They have been
hiring loss control engineers at a consistent pace, including trainees. Regional
companies, with their growth prospects, do represent an attractive career
alternative. PEO's have become a specific, fast growing niche market for the
workers'
comp safety professional but to date seem unwilling to be competitive
salary-wise. One final group, the TPA is facing a potential growth opportunity due
to the amount of run-offbusiness that needs addressing. These may prove to be a
developing arena for the loss control professional but we have not had enough
exposure to determine their potential.
So what is the profile of the typical candidate we encounter today? I believe we have all
had enough exposure in the last few years to know that they have two dominant attributes.
They are recycled and graying. They also are at the higher end ofyour salary scales. It is
possible that almost 50percent of the loss control pool will surpass 55 years ofage in the
next six years. But because of the decline in their retirement plans, theywill be working
longer. The good news is they will still be active in our labor pool and providemuch
needed experienced talent for the next ten years.
Since 1993, the lack of training ofcollege graduates has been key to a shortage of
younger candidates. However, the best news is that companies are reinitiating structured
training programs. This is our only hope andwithin 3 years our tired applicant pool
should be flush with bright, young candidates. It usually takes longer than we think to
train and shape a truly productive loss control engineer so it could take longer. CNA, St.
Paul, Travelers and Wausau are only a few companies with aggressive training goals. I
checked with placement counselors from several of the schools that offer degrees in
Occupational Health & Safety so that I could tell you where all these students have been
finding employment in the last 5 years. 40percent of the graduates went to private
industrywith the construction industry taking the largest share. Many went to small
consulting companies with fewer than 40 employees and 20percentwent to governmental
positions. 20 to 30percent of their graduates were recruited and trained by the insurance
industry. The numbers going to both insurance andmanufacturing declined. The other
lOpercent are still living off their parents and traveling around the world.
So it appears that a good number ofrecent graduates are a qualified addition to our loss
control pool. But is this really true? TheMTV generation has a short attention span. They
arematerialistic. They live at a hectic pace. To this generation, loyalty is a subjective
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concept. They keep their options open and make decisions based on the prospect of
opportunity. As one college placement counselor put it, they change jobs readily and
often for a variety of reasons. Their computers are constantly in touch with the Internet
community, their instantmessenger buddy lists are long and their cell phones never stop
ringing. Without a revitalized, dynamic anD viable career path, can the insurance industry
really expect to corral this energy for the long term?
Public awareness of safety professionals has increased. When people I encounter askme
what specialty I recruit and I say
"safety" I still get many inquisitive looks followed by
"What's that?" But it happens less often now. TV ads such as Liberty
Mutual'
s have done
a lot to educate the consumer on the function ofgood safety professionals. Public
awareness ofhazard exposures, especially in the crisis related areas, coupled with
security, terrorism and disaster preparedness has increased. As consumer products
become more complicated, safety analysis becomes a more public issue.
Many professionals believe there has never been a greater opportunity for loss control in
the business world than now. As businesses consolidate, automate and streamline their
operations, we find a greater demand for the loss control engineer's ability to insure that
safety requirements are met. More corporate managers perceive the real value of loss
control as an essential piece in keeping expenses down, including the cost of insurance
coverage, terms and pricing. Even in the middle market, a trend is emerging where these
accounts are becoming more sophisticated and realize finally, that losses can be managed.
However, insurance loss control managers must prove the value of their departments.
This is critical to the survival of their loss control departments. Seniormanagement is still
looking for ways to take the cost out ofdoing business and outsourcing has always a been
a solution in that type ofenvironment. But an out-sourced report is only economical if it
is accurate enough for its conclusions to be counted upon. An insurance loss control staff
has an on-going commitment to its accounts and a long-term objective of lowering losses.
This cannot be done with poor reports. Momentarily, service and quality reports are still
predominantly produced by in-house loss control departments but the better outside
sources are closing the gap and are becoming an increasing threat to the survival of
traditional loss control departments. From an underwriting point ofview loss controlmay
be back in vogue again. We have been in a market where risk selection has become more
important than risk improvement. Butmarket forces have created a renewed focus on
quality underwriting and the use of loss control not only provides a good evaluation as to
the worthiness ofan account but also a more precise criterion for the calculation of
premium. Until human behavior changes, there will always be the need for expert
verification for the risk of the insured.
Today's loss control engineers still have an authentic commitment to their profession and
to keeping people safe and losses under control. The best of them are not bean counters.
They want to be engaged and a valued part ofthe team thatmakes the important
decisions. As Richard Hughes stresses in his poignantwork, Bringing Down the Safety
Guy, the loss ofhuman contact is the loss of the soul of the safety profession.
Underwriting surveys and service plans produced from desktop based OSHA logs and
loss records have a place, but they cannot replace the safety persons intimate connection
to real faces and real life circumstances.
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Our safety professionals have not given up. In spite ofall the negativity and obstacles that
have been handed to them every day in our struggling industry, they are truly resilient and
still dream ofworking for a company that appreciates them and lets them do their job.
Before we saw the optimism expressed in this survey, we were questioning the state of
mind of the loss control community and the future of loss control as a profession. We
were truly encouraged by the results.
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APPENDIX F
CATEGORY RESULTS EXPRESSED IN percent OF TOTAL RESPONDENTS
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTSWAS 319.
PERSONAL/INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS:
How many years have you been in insurance loss control?
1-5 Yrs 9.09
5-10 Yrs 15.36
10-15 Yrs 21.00
15-20 Yrs 18.81
20 Plus Yrs 35.11
How many companies have youworked for?
1-2 Companies 30.41
3-4 Companies 48.90
5-6 Companies 15.99
7 Plus Companies 4.39
Have you ever been downsized?
Never Downsized 38.24
Once Downsized 30.41
Twice Downsized 21.32
More Than Twice 9.40
How many more years do you plan on being an active candidate for
opportunities in the insurance industry?
1-5 More Years 13.17
5-10 More Years 21.32
10-15 More Years 30.72
15-20More Years 18.81
20 Plus More Years 15.05
How would you classify your current position?
Management 23.82
AccountManagement 9.09
Consultant 56.74
Field Representative 26.65
What type ofcar package do you have?
Company Car 50.78
Car Allowance 14.73
Reimbursement 19.44
No Car Package 17.55
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How has your car package changed over the last five years?
Costs More 44.20
Costs Less 6.90
No Change 32.60
Cars Costs N/A 13.48
JOB SPECIFIC QUESTIONS:
Howmany visits are you required to make in a week?
None 17.55
1-5 Visits 33.23
5-10 Visits 32.29
10-15 Visits 9.09
More than 15 Visits 6.58
Has the required number ofvisits increased over the last five years?
Increased Visits 39.81
Decreased Visits 46.71
Not Sure 8.78
Ifyou are on a billable hours system, how many hours per week are you
expected to bill?
Not Applicable 46.08
Less than 35 10.34
35-40 25.08
40 Plus 11.29
Howwould you characterize your company's productivity expectations?
Easy 3.45
Realistic 42.95
Ambitious 36.05
Unrealistic 15.36
What percentage ofyour time is spent at your desk writing reports?
25 Percent 11.91
35 Percent 28.21
50 Percent 43.89
75 Percent 12.85
75+ Percent 1.25
On average, how long does a report take from start to finish?
lHour 6.58
2 Hours 29.15
3 Hours 19.12
4 Hours 16.30
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4+ Hours 26.96
How often are you required/expected to go into a branch office?
Never 29.78
Once a Quarter 13.79
Once aMonth 15.36
Once aWeek 21.63
More than Once/Week 15.99
Would you prefer to be spending more time working directlywith clients?
Yes 79.94
No 5.02
Not Sure 5.64
Don't Care 6.27
Has computerization made your job easier?
Yes 68.03
No 24.45
Not Sure 5.02
Has email helped your relationship with your supervisor?
Yes 52.35
No 24.14
Not Sure 7.21
No Change 15.05
Besides computer skills enhancement, whenwas the last time your company sent
you to a training session?
Within the last 6Months 45.77
Within the last 12 Mos. 21.94
Within the last 24Mos. 9.72
Within the last 36Mos. 5.64
More than 3 years ago 12.23
Has your company hired any trainees in the last 2 years?
None Hired 64.89
1-2 Hired 20.69
3 Plus Hired 10.66
What categories are creating the most difficulties for you?
Reports 27.59
Technical Difficulties 2.82
Uncertainty 45.14
Management 25.08
Other 15.67
CAREER:
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Where do you feel future opportunities exist for you?
Private Industry 38.24
Insurance 51.72
Independent 41.07
Fee Companies 17.87
Government 11.60
Other 6.58
Do you feel loss control has a future in the Insurance industry?
Yes 69.59
No 10.03
Not Sure 19.75
Is your current job addressing your passion to do effective safety/injury
preventionwork?
Yes 43.57
No 47.02
Not Sure 7.84
Do you feel that you are "burned out"on the industry?
Yes 26.02
No 58.31
Not Sure 13.79
Do you feel you are making a difference at your accounts?
Yes 69.59
No 17.87
Not Sure 11.60
Over the last ten years, do you feel the perception by uppermanagement of
safety as a value-added product has changed?
Increased 38.24
Decreased 32.60
Not Changed 21.00
Not Sure 5.33
As companies outsource their work, do you feel that independent professionals
have become a significant threat to your security?
Yes 27.27
No 55.17
Not Sure 15.05
Do you consider fee companies a viable option for your career?
Yes 42.63
No 40.44
Not Sure 14.73
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How often do you search the Internet to research the job market?
Daily 15.05
Weekly 31.03
TwiceMonthly 9.40
Monthly 31.97
Howwould you characterize your current efforts towards a job search?
Unemployed Active 8.78
Employed Active 27.27
Passive 39.50
Not Looking 23.82
Would you leave insurance ifyou had the chance to do safety in a different
environment?
Yes 66.77
No 11.29
Not Sure 19.12
Would you leave safety entirely ifyou had an option?
Yes 40.13
No 32.92
Not Sure 25.39
Would you recommend loss control as a career choice to a trainee prospect?
Yes 47.65
No 34.17
Not Sure 15.99
Please rate the overall tone ofyour comments.
Optimistic 36.99
Pessimistic 24.14
Neutral 34.48
Loss Control Survey, October 2003 Pat AllenAssociates, Inc.
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APPENDIX G
SALARY RESULTS
1. 286 of the respondents wrote in the actual dollar amount. (In some cases ranges
given as i.e. 50K-70Kwere logged in at the average, in this case, 60K.)
2. 80percent ofall 319 respondents regarded their location as "Urban" vs. "Rural".
3. 48.26percent of all the respondents fall into the $60,000 - $79,000 range.
4. More people earn over $100,000 than under $40,000!
DOLLAR
RANGE
NUMBER IN
CATEGORY
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
25,000-39,000 7 2.45percent
40,000 - 49,000 24 8.39percent
50,000 - 59,000 45 15.73percent
60,000-69,000 69 24.13percent
70,000-79,000 69 24.13percent
80,000-89,000 41 14.34percent
90,000-100,000 19 6.64percent
100,001 + 12 4.20percent
Loss Control Survey, October 2003 PatAllenAssociates, Inc.
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THE FOLLOWING REFLECTS INSTANCES OF IDENTICAL PERCENTAGES
TO UNRELATED QUESTIONS. (THESE MAY BE PURELY COINCIDENTAL.)
69.69
percent
Loss Control has a future.
Yes, doing satisfying loss control.
23.82
percent
Defined their position as Management
Not looking
38.24
percent
Never been downsized
Management's perception of loss control has increased
Private industry is an option
17.87
percent
Fee companies are a career option
Not making a difference with their accounts
27.27
percent
Independents are a threat
Employed and actively looking
21.00
percent
10-15 Years in Loss Control
Management's Perception ofLoss Control has not changed
15.36
percent
5-10 Years in Loss Control
Unrealistic Goals
In the office once amonth
15.99
percent
5-6 Companies
In the office more than once a week
Not Sure if they would recommend the career
24.14
percent
Email has not helpedwith their supervisor
Rated the overall tone of their comments as pessimistic
30.41
percent
12 Companies
Once Downsized
17.55
percent
No Car Package
No Visits per week
15.05
percent
20 Plus years as a candidate
Daily Job Search
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Not Sure if independents are a threat
^_^_
Email has produced no change in supervisor relationships
Loss Control Survey, October 2003 Pat Allen Associates, Inc.
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